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CIVIL JUSTICE AND THE CONSTITUTION: LIMITS ON
INSTRUMENTAL JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION IN
JAPAN
Mark A. Levin†
It is confidence in the men and women who administer the judicial system
that is the true backbone of the rule of law.1
Abstract: Numerous works have shown how central judicial administrators in
Japan may ideologically influence the nation’s lower court judges. This piece draws
upon these reports to analyze and frame these circumstances as “instrumental judicial
administration,” qualitatively distinguishing the various means used by administrators
and reflecting on their degrees of impact on civil procedural justice. Then, moving
from description to prescription, the work provides a thorough consideration of the
underlying legal context, broadly drawing from constitutional text and history, statutory
text, and case law, before launching a search for solutions in its conclusion. Although
the immediate focus is on how instrumental judicial administration emerges in the
Japanese civil justice system, the approach here is broadly applicable for studies of the
roles of judges and functions of courts generally.

INTRODUCTION: THE ARTS OF DESIGNING MEN2

I.

In the United States, we recognize a fundamental constitutional right
to due process in civil litigation which derives from the Fourteenth
Amendment of our Constitution.3 Of course, the devil lies in the details
and the interpretation of that right is subject to vigorous debate,4 but few

†

Associate Professor of Law, William S. Richardson School of Law. Funding for this work was
generously supported by the Kashiwagi Endowment at the William S. Richardson School of Law and inkind contributions during an extended research visit at the Hokkaido University School of Law. Much
appreciation is owed to Professors Daniel Foote, John Haley, David Law, Ichiro Ozaki, Eiji Sasada, Susumi
Takami, and Yasuhei Taniguchi for their time in interviews, conversation, and comments and to Keiko
Okuhara, Kahlan Salina, and Kori Weinberger for their research assistance. Unless indicated otherwise,
statutory translations are drawn from the Japanese Ministry of Justice’s Japanese Law Translation website,
www.Japaneselawtranslation.co.jp and all other translations are the author’s.
This paper is dedicated to the memory of Chief Justice William S. Richardson, whose legacy in
promoting justice continues through the Law School that he envisioned to reality. Aloha CJ.
1
Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 128 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
2
“Independence of the judges is equally requisite to guard the Constitution and the rights of
individuals from the effects of those ill humors which the arts of designing men, or the influence of
particular conjunctures, sometimes disseminate among the people themselves.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 78
(Alexander Hamilton).
3
“No State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law . . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
4
Compare Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal Co., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009) with id. at 2252
(Roberts, C.J., Scalia, J., dissenting).
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would argue with the singular “axiomatic” principle that “[a] fair trial in a
fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process.”5
The existence of such a right and the essential nature of the principle
is easy to understand. No civil litigation system will attain any meaningful
degree of legitimacy if it is lacking a governing regime of basic procedural
fairness.6 Johannes Chan, University of Hong Kong Faculty of Law Dean,
sources this value in Western society back as far as the Old Testament story
of Adam and Eve7 and through to the Magna Carta.8 Accordingly, this
right is vitally recognized as a global norm in the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights 9 and the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights.10
Not surprisingly, Japan has also enshrined the notion of procedural
fairness in civil justice into its legal system, with direct ties into its
constitutional language, treaty obligations, and statutory provisions. The
leading formulation of this emerges in Article 32 of the Constitution of
Japan (“Constitution”) which simply provides: “No person shall be denied
the right of access to the courts.”11 Just as United States constitutional
language gives name to the Due Process doctrine, this provision gives name
to the legal doctrine as it is known in Japan—saiban wo ukeru kenri.12
Of course, constitutional ideals never perfectly describe real world
practices.13 Like that of the United States, Japan’s reality demonstrates
5

Id. at 2259 (citing In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955)).
See, e.g., J. A. Jolowicz, On the Nature and Purposes of Civil Procedural Law, in INTERNATIONAL
PERSPECTIVES ON CIVIL JUSTICE: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF SIR JACK I.H. JACOB Q.C., 27, 37 (I.R. Scott ed.,
Sweet & Maxwell 1990) (“The importance of achieving justice between individual litigants is in no way
diminished by recognition that the process of litigation, considered as a whole, serves at least two other
ends, connected but distinct, and that their attainment should be included in the purposes of procedural law.
First, civil proceedings serve to demonstrate the effectiveness of the law. . . .”) (emphasis added).
7
Johannes Chan, Keynote Address for the Inaugural East Asian Law and Society Conference in
Hong Kong (Feb. 5, 2010) 1 (transcript on file with author) (tracing the right to fair hearing “to the Old
Testament when God provided Adam and Eve a chance to be heard before he condemned them for taking
the forbidden fruit.”)
8
Id. at 1-2 (quoting MAGNA CARTA art. 29, “No Freeman shall be . . . disseised of his Freehold, or
Liberties, or free Customs, . . . but by lawful judgment of his Peers, or by the Law of the Land.”).
9
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, art. 10, UN Doc. A/RES/217 (III)
(Dec. 10 1948) [hereinafter UDHR].
10
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), arts. 14 and 26,
U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 16 at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16 1966) [hereinafter CCPR].
11
KENPŌ, art. 32. This standard English translation poorly captures the Japanese language nuance.
A more accurate translation might read “the right to obtain judicial hearings” or perhaps even “the right to
obtain justice in the courts.” See text and sources cited infra notes 114-115.
12
KENPŌ, art. 32; see generally SHIGENORI MATSUI, SAIBAN WO UKERU KENRI [THE RIGHT OF
ACCESS TO THE COURTS] (Nihon Hyoronsha1993).
13
Perhaps the most dramatic dichotomy was the one between the utopian idealism of the
Constitution of the Soviet Union with the reality that could be found there. Contrast KONSTITUTSIIA
SSSR (1977) [Konst. SSSR] [USSR Constitution] (1936) with ALEKSANDR ISAEVICH SOLZHENITSYN, THE
6
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flaws; important writings on the courts and society in Japan provide
substantial evidence that procedural fairness for some civil litigants in Japan
suffers from serious defects.14 This article seeks to explain the doctrinal
legal context of those circumstances by looking to the legal texts and case
law concerning Japan's relevant constitutional provisions, treaty obligations,
and statutory enactments, including relevant historical events. More
importantly, this article aims to rise up from the problems towards a search
for solutions. Its ultimate goal is a remedial inquiry into what can and
should be done to address these problems.
In short, this article explores the legal foundations of procedural civil
justice in Japan as they relate to an evident history of a practice labeled
“instrumental judicial administration.” Part II begins by defining that
concept as used in this writing and then presents the available evidence,
suggesting that: 1) instrumental judicial administration is active in Japan's
judicial processes, and 2) it detrimentally impacts the fairness of the results
attained by litigants in a range of socially significant cases. Part III
extensively reviews the law that ostensibly governs these circumstances,
including constitutional doctrine, treaty obligations, and statutory provisions,
looking first to protections for procedural civil justice and then to the
structural foundation for Japan’s unified centralized system of judicial
administration that makes instrumental judicial administration so easily
accomplished. Finally, Part IV concludes the paper by briefly laying out a
framework for remedies and policy solutions—whether by actions of
individual litigants, by the enactment of new laws, or by the judiciary’s
internal reform.
II.

POWERS: INSTRUMENTAL JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION

A.

The Metaphorical Thumb on the Scale

In this paper, I use “instrumental judicial administration” to mean
mechanisms or actions employed by judicial administrators to intentionally
bias adjudicatory processes in favor of a particular party or result despite
lacking authority as to the disposition of the subject case or class of cases.
In other words, instrumental judicial administration contemplates intentional
actions, carried out through the exercise of judicial administration, that aim
GULAG ARCHIPELAGO, 1918-56 (Thomas P. Whitney & H.T. Willetts trans., Basic Books 1997) and DAVID
REMNICK, LENIN'S TOMB: THE LAST DAYS OF THE SOVIET EMPIRE (Vintage 1993). But surely gaps
between the ideals expressed in the document and the reality in fact arise in any constitutional state.
14
See infra at Part II.B. This article draws primarily from existing writings on the subject and
leaves closer investigation of these defects for another day.
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to distort a structurally neutral court proceeding towards a result determined
extrinsically from the litigation process between the parties. It is a
metaphorical thumb placed from above on the scale that tilts the balance of
justice to favor one side over the other. And thus, by definition, it is
always unfair to some party or parties in the judicial process.
Of course, not all judicial administration is instrumental judicial
administration. Judicial administration is a necessary component of any
judicial system15 that may accomplish distinctly laudable ends.16 There
may also be instances where substantively neutral choices in judicial
administration have an inadvertent but nonetheless detrimental impact on
fairness.17 Circumstances where there is no intention to bias substantive
results are not included in the conception of instrumental judicial
administration developed here.
A number of additional clarifications may be helpful. First and most
importantly, Japan’s judiciary enjoys a globally recognized reputation for its
institutional integrity and the integrity of the judges within it. 18 With
nearly thirty years of observational experience and study behind me, I
emphatically agree that this exemplary reputation is deserved.19 Though
some degree of criticism is inevitable and some may be fitting, this is
15
However, differences in how judicial administration systems are structured or carried out will
either facilitate or impede the likelihood of instrumental judicial administration becoming a problem.
16
Thus for example, Ramseyer and Rasmusen show that Japan’s judicial quality control mechanisms
“illustrate[ ] the potential benefits to bureaucratic judiciaries . . . . In simple routine cases, [the Secretariat’s
ability to reassign and manipulate the promotion of judges] facilitates pressure towards enhancing quality:
judges who are talented and hard-working and decide difficult cases correctly receive better jobs and
greater responsibilities.”
J. MARK RAMSEYER & ERIC B. RASMUSEN, MEASURING JUDICIAL
INDEPENDENCE: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF JUDGING IN JAPAN 95 (Univ. of Chicago Press 2003)
[hereinafter MEASURING JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE].
17
One example may be pressures put on Japanese judges for high levels of efficiency and rapid case
resolution that impede judges’ capacities to optimize litigation results. See, e.g., Masaki Abe, The
Internal Control of a Bureaucratic Judiciary: The Case of Japan, 23 INT'L J. SOC. L. 303, 313 (1995)
(describing a “criterion of efficiency” applied by Japanese judicial administrators); see also Eric K.
Yamamoto, Efficiency’s Threat to the Value of Accessible Courts for Minorities, 25 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV 341 (1990).
18
Without a doubt, the most forceful English language advocate for this position is Professor John
Haley. As he recently wrote, “Japanese judges are among the most honest, politically independent, and
professionally competent in the world today.” John O. Haley, The Japanese Judiciary: Maintaining
Integrity, Autonomy, and the Public Trust, in LAW IN JAPAN: A TURNING POINT 99 (Daniel H. Foote ed.,
Univ. of Tokyo Press 2007). In a sub-section of that chapter entitled “Integrity,” Haley substantiates his
point with data evidencing a striking absence of corruption. Id. at 112-14 (“Whatever the cause, by all
accounts, judicial corruption is simply unheard of in Japan.”).
19
Further praise can be found in MEASURING JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE, supra note 16; see also J.
Mark Ramseyer & Eric B. Rasmusen, The Case for Managed Judges: Learning from Japan After the
Political Upheaval of 1993, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1879, 1880 (2006) [hereinafter Managed Judges]
(“Through its ‘managed judges,’ . . . Japan maintains a system that lets people resolve their disputes by
uniform and predictable legal standards.”).
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because no system is perfect.20 This article does not seek to call into
question the fundamental character of Japan’s judiciary as being welldeserving of the accolades it frequently receives.
Accordingly, it is also crucial to note that instrumental judicial
administration is not synonymous with corruption. While it is certainly
possible that instrumental judicial administration would be motivated by
corruption, motives may be benign or even well-intentioned towards the
public good. In fact, instrumental judicial administration in Japan appears
to be motivated by a complex and beneficent mix of aims, including
protecting the overall autonomy of the judiciary from political interference,21
and with good moral intentions of prioritizing the achievement of consistent
results across all cases and all circumstances above fairness to particular
individuals in particular cases.22
At the same time, instrumental judicial administration will ordinarily
require a lack of candor and transparency with regards to its practice.
Every judicial system pays lip service to procedural fairness as these values
are enshrined in the world’s human rights treaties and national constitutions.
Thus, few judicial administrators will gladly come forward to admit an
intentional disregard for fairness in civil litigation for even benign or well20
Public opinions of the Japanese judiciary are reported to be very favorable. Daniel H. Foote,
Recent Reforms to the Japanese Judiciary: Real Change or Mere Appearance?, 66 HŌ-SHAKAIGAKU
[SOCIOLOGY L.] 128 (2007) (“Opinion polls of the Japanese public have consistently recorded rather high
levels of respect for the judiciary.” citing Chuō Chōsasha (2004)). Nevertheless, at least one significant
survey reveals more mixed results. An interview survey carried out by the Japanese government’s
Judicial Reform Council from a representative sample of former civil trial litigants in June 2000 determined
a mean score of only 3.13 (1 = very unsatisfied, 5 = very satisfied; SD = 1.27) with regards to their
evaluation of fairness of the nation’s civil judicial system. Ken-ichi Ohbuchi et al., Procedural Justice
and the Assessment of Civil Justice in Japan, 39 L. & SOC'Y REV. 875, 882 (2005). Of course these results
were shaped by respondents’ satisfaction with the outcomes they had received, but “the standardized total
effect of perceived procedural fairness on the evaluation of the judicial system was larger than that of
favorability of the outcome. . . . [W]hat the litigants obtained from the civil trials was not the primary
influence on their evaluation of the judicial system. Instead their perception of procedural fairness of the
trials was more influential in this regard.” Id. at 887.
21
Again, the leading proponent of these ideas is John Haley. See Haley, supra note 18, at 112-14.
Longtime observer Professor Yasuhei Taniguchi also believes a perceived vulnerability within the courts
may lead a Chief Justice to justify instrumental judicial administration measures in order to protect the
judiciary’s hard-earned and highly valued autonomy. Interview with Professor Yasuhei Taniguchi, in
Honolulu, Hawai‘i (Oct. 28, 2009) [hereinafter Taniguchi interview]. See also Haley, supra note 18, at
120-27; David Law, The Anatomy of a Conservative Court: Judicial Review in Japan, 87 TEX. L. REV.
1545, 1586-93 (2009); Abe, supra note 17, at 313-18; David M. O'Brien & Yasuo Ohkoshi, Stifling
Judicial Independence from Within: The Japanese Judiciary, in JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN THE AGE OF
DEMOCRACY: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES FROM AROUND THE WORLD 37, 59 (Peter H. Russell & David M.
O'Brien eds., Univ. of Virginia Press 2001).
22
See MEASURING JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE, supra note 16; see also Managed Judges, supra note
19, at 1927-28. This was similarly expressed by Professor Eiji Sasada, who characterized uniformity as
“the pride of Japan’s Supreme Court.” Interview with Professor Eiji Sasada, Professor of Constitutional
Law, Hokkaido University School of Law, Sapporo, Japan (July 15, 2009) [hereinafter Sasada interview].
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intentioned institutional or public purposes. 23
Institutional judicial
administration will ordinarily be hidden away by those who carry it out.
Finally, instrumental judicial administration constitutes a distortion of
the process regardless of whether the action ultimately accomplishes its
intended result. As with the Hiraga memo discussed below, interfering
administrators who definitively lack authority as deciders in a matter may
not be guaranteed their hoped-for results. But their work should still be a
matter of concern with regards to the system’s fairness. Simply put, this is
not the way that the system is supposed to work.
B.

Evidence of Instrumental Judicial Administration in Japan

Mechanisms of instrumental judicial administration can range across a
continuum between diffuse to direct measures. In Japan, the most diffuse
may be administrators’ de facto powers over judicial selection, which are
used to bring in a cadre of judges reflecting certain social and political
mindsets. Direct intervention is exemplified by the circumstances of the
Hiraga memorandum, discussed in greater detail infra, where the chief
judge of the Sapporo District Court sent “friendly advice from a senior
colleague” that advised how the chief would likely decide a pending matter
(that he was uninvolved with) on the constitutionality of Japan’s self-defense
forces.24 It seems easy to suggest that direct interventions should be of the
greatest concern, but both poles and what lies in between are considered in
this article.25

23
This is for good reason. As Nuno Garoupa and Tom Ginsberg have demonstrated, “reputation
matters.” Nuno Garoupa and Tom Ginsberg, Reputation, Information, and the Organization of the
Judiciary, John M. Olin Law & Economics Working Paper No. 503 (2d Series) 2-3 (Dec. 2009) (“First, it
conveys information to the uninformed general public about the quality of the judiciary . . . as perceived by
the relevant audiences. Second, reputation fosters esteem for the profession and for the individual
judge . . .” ). See also Nuno Garoupa and Tom Ginsberg, Judicial Audiences and Reputation:
Perspectives from Comparative Law, 47 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 451, 455 (2009) (distinguishing
“career” from “recognition” judiciaries and noting the impact this distinction will have on the incentives
that motivate judges in their work).
24
Although the court may have been somewhat smaller at the time, the Sapporo District Court
presently includes 54 full-time judges. Courts in Japan, An Introduction to Sapporo District Courts (Apr.
2010), http://www.courts.go.jp/sapporo/about/syokai/index01.html (in Japanese).
Accordingly, the
“chief” is well above his juniors in the judicial hierarchy.
25
This article focuses primarily on administrative influences on lower court judges in Japan. In
that, it draws upon but differs from David Law's recent socio-legal work exploring the inner workings of
Japan's Supreme Court. Law’s work clearly writes the book on how administrative circumstances
constrain Supreme Court justices who would go against the ideological and political mainstream of the
courts. Law's article deserves further recognition for reconstructing the vast body of writings on the
Japanese judiciary into a single compendium. While many prior writings remain foundational, Law's
article should be anyone’s first stop on the Japanese judiciary research highway. See David Law, The
Anatomy of a Conservative Court: Judicial Review in Japan, 87 TEX. L. REV. 1545 (2009).
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I spread the evidence out across this continuum from diffuse to direct,
framing it into four distinct tiers:
1) Administrators’ de facto powers over judicial selection,
which are used to generate a cadre of judges reflecting
certain social and political mindsets and to exclude others;
2) Administrators’ powers over assignments, transfer,
promotion, and retention, which may be employed with
carrots and sticks aiming to influence the ideological and
political behavior of judges 26 and/or to sequester
noncompliant judges in less significant postings or remove
them from the judiciary entirely;
3) Using judicial working groups and internal position papers
to influence judge’s decisions in specific categories of cases;
and,
4) Direct actions by administrators to achieve results in
particular cases. Potential mechanisms are assigning or
transferring into a particular case a judge who can be
expected to give the desired result27 or hidden interventions
taken by senior judges to steer junior judges in the exercise
of their decision making authority as was exposed with
regards to the Hiraga memorandum.
1.

Tier 1: Judicial Selection to Shape the Judiciary

Formally speaking, the constitutional authority to appoint Japan’s
lower court judges lies with the Cabinet at the head of Japan’s Executive
Branch. Article 80 of the Constitution provides: “The judges of the
inferior courts shall be appointed by the Cabinet from a list of persons
nominated by the Supreme Court.”28 As to the Supreme Court’s authority
to nominate judges expressed in that provision, the Court Act puts this in the
collective hands of the Supreme Court’s justices operating as a Judicial
Assembly with the Chief Justice serving as its chair.29
26

This presumes most judges being susceptible to such carrots and sticks. There may be some
(heroic or foolish, depending on one’s point of view) who will not care about or will choose to disregard
these considerations.
27
Or removing a judge who may be perceived as likely to issue an undesired ruling while concealing
this intention through the ordinary process of transferring Japanese judges around the country.
28
KENPŌ, art. 80. This point is reiterated nearly verbatim in Saibanshohō [Court Act], Law No. 59
of 1947, art. 40, para. 1.
29
In this delegation to the Judicial Assembly, the law is entirely explicit: “(1) The Supreme Court
shall execute judicial administration affairs through deliberations of the Judicial Assembly and under the
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The reality is quite different. The front line for recruiting and
selecting appropriate candidates for judgeships is maintained by an elite set
of judges—the instructors at the Legal Training and Research Institute
(“LTRI”), the training facility that all future legal professionals in Japan
must pass through. These screening agents come handpicked by the
Personal Affairs Bureau of the General Secretariat of the Supreme Court,30
which ultimately controls the entire process.31
Historically, the LTRI instructors generated reviews and reports on all
trainees for the General Secretariat, which then prepared a draft list of
nominees for the Judicial Assembly’s approval, and then the same was
forwarded on to the Cabinet. The latter engagements of the Judicial
Assembly and the Cabinet were toothless. The process in reality belonged
to the judicial administrators at the General Secretariat, operating as a black
box,32 with its picks nearly always finally confirmed.33
Of course, the screening process took into account the legal expertise
demonstrated by trainees at the Institute. But the assessment did not end
with the legal mind. Rather a “‘systematic purge’ of ideologically
unsuitable judges . . . begins with the first day of the LTRI training”34 as “it
falls upon the LTRI adjudication instructors to identify those who are
suitable for judgeships and to dissuade those who are unsuitable from even
applying for position.”35

general supervision of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court; (2) The Judicial Assembly shall consist of
all Justices, and the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall be the chairperson.” Saibanshohō [Court
Act], Law No. 59 of 1947, art. 12. But see id. at art. 13 (“The Supreme Court shall have a General
Secretariat, which shall handle administrative affairs of the Supreme Court.”).
30
Id.
31
Law, supra note 25, at 1553 (citing Setsuo Miyazawa, The Politics of Judicial Reform in Japan:
The Rule of Law at Last?, ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL'Y J. (Special Issue) 89, 112 (2001)); Abe, supra note 17, at
306 (interview with “Judge no. 4”). For a more complete explanation of the structure and operations of
the General Secretariat, see Setsuo Miyazawa, Administrative Control of Japanese Judges, 25 KOBE U. L.
REV. 45, 48-50 (1991); Abe, supra note 17, at 311-12. The formal responsibility for selecting LTRI
instructors rests with the Supreme Court Judicial Assembly, but it is carried out by the General Secretariat.
See Law, supra note 25, at 1553 (citing Abe, supra note 17, at 306).
32
Foote, supra note 20, at 153 (noting a view of the former system as “a complete black box, with
no outside review and no opportunity for the General Secretariat to justify its determinations.”).
33
Haley, supra note 18, at 103 (citing Takaaki Hattori, The Role of the Supreme Court of Japan in
the Field of Judicial Administration, 60 WASH. L. REV. 69 (1984)). However, Foote reports that ten
candidates were denied initial appointment in the fifteen years between 1978 and 2003 (perhaps evidencing
baby teeth?) but gives no further detail as to what underlie these rejections. Foote, supra note 20, at 135.
34
Law, supra note 25, at 1552 (quoting Lawrence Repeta, Professor, Omiya Law School, in Tokyo,
Japan (July 4, 2008)).
35
“These instructors are responsible for preparing secret evaluations of all trainees and thus must
observe the entire class closely from the outset.” Law, supra note 25, at 1554 (citing Foote, supra note
20, at 146 and Interview with Justice A).
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The lack of transparency in the process of judicial appointments
attracted criticism during recent judicial reform discussions carried out by
the Judicial Reform Council. 36 As a result, a Lower Court Judge
Designation Consultation Commission (“Commission”) was established by
law as part of a reform package and began operating in 2003. 37
Nevertheless, critics have identified the Commission as deficient in its
progress towards achieving transparency in the process 38 and being so
opaque in its operations that no meaningful assessment can be formed on its
other objectives of “objectivity in the judicial appointment process and
[ensuring] that the views of the public are reflected in the process.”39 As
Professor Daniel Foote observed: “[w]hile a few elite outsiders are now
involved in the review process, and the range of information available
regarding candidates appears to have expanded somewhat, the dominant
message remains: Trust us, and do not expect any concrete information
about how the relevant standards are applied, much less specific
candidates.”40
To summarize, Tier 1 instrumental judicial administration takes place
through the selection of judges. An elite “self-replicating clique of
judges”41 in the General Secretariat has captured the judicial hiring process
and employs it so as to make its best efforts in ideologically screening who
will become lower court judges. Through this mechanism and over time,
this clique of judges has selected a national cadre of judges who will be most
36

“The Council called for re-examination of the procedures for appointing lower court judges and
greater openness in that process. In the words of the Council, ‘the process by which the Supreme Court
nominates candidates [for lower court appointments] is not necessarily clear, and the views of the people
cannot penetrate that process . . . . [F]rom the standpoint of strengthening the confidence of the people
toward the judges, in order to reflect the views of the people in the [appointment] process, a body should be
established . . . which, upon receiving consultations from the Supreme Court, selects the appropriate
candidates and [makes recommendations] to the Supreme Court.’ The Council added, ‘[M]echanisms
should be established to assure that the process is transparent, including disclosing the selection standards,
procedures, schedule and other matters.’” Foote, supra note 20, at 143 (quoting Judicial Reform Counsel
final report).
37
For details on its structure and operations, see Foote, supra note 20, at 143-51.
38
This is not to say that the Commission has been wholly impotent. Foote reports that in its first
four years of operations, roughly ten percent of applicants were deemed unsuitable or had their applications
withdrawn. However, he also notes that “a more cynical assessment” might conclude “that the
establishment of the Commission has provided the General Secretariat with greater freedom to reject
applications than it enjoyed previously.” Foote, supra note 20, at 152-53.
39
Id. at 144 (“Because the third objective of transparency has hardly been achieved, there is little
way of knowing for certain whether the other objectives have been achieved; one can only hope they have
been.”) See also Law, supra note 25, at 155-56 (drawing upon Foote and his own interview with a
committee source).
40
Foote, supra note 20, at 151.
41
Law, supra note 25, at 1590. Law presents significant detail regarding the mechanisms of this
“circular and self reinforcing” process. Id. at 1563-64.

274

PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL

VOL. 20 NO. 2

likely to share the elite group’s social and political mindsets.
Consequently, this inputs into the system a constant set of background biases
with regards to politically significant cases. The value choices may
indirectly reflect political values and interests of Japan’s elected officials or
of the electorate more generally speaking,42 but at the bottom line, these
choices are made by and mediated through judicial administrators in the
General Secretariat. In short, the General Secretariat stacks the deck of
cards, where the cards represent the “who” of Japan’s lower courts, so as to
make it most likely that its views will be reflected in future decisions.43
2.

Tier 2: Assignments, Transfer, Promotion, and Retention

Independence of judges in Japan is constitutionally mandated: “All
judges shall be independent in the exercise of their conscience and shall be
bound only by this Constitution and the laws.”44 Arguably, the General
Secretariat’s Tier 1 control over the hiring of lower court judges should not
impair the independence of individual judges in carrying out their jobs
because a rigged process ex ante to make it likely that the judge will see eyeto-eye with the General Secretariat’s values and views means that there
should then be no perceived inconsistency with or interruption in the
individual judge’s naturally occurring deliberative processes ex post. But
circumstances are dramatically different with regards to the powers that
central judicial administrators in the Supreme Court General Secretariat have
with regards to the totality of personnel decisions that affect judges in
service.45
As personnel considerations inevitably fall into the calculus that every
judge makes in pursuing their careers, these powers directly implicate the
independence of individual judges. Accordingly, to the extent that cases
42
This divide is the fault line in the analytical division between Professors Mark Ramseyer and John
Haley. In a valiant effort, Professor Frank Upham has attempted to reconcile their differences or at least
to flesh out how methodology, rather than the reality of the circumstances, may be underlying those
differences. Frank K. Upham, Political Lackeys or Faithful Public Servants? Two Views of the Japanese
Judiciary, 30 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 421 (2005).
43
As Upham aptly notes, “the difference between Haley and Ramseyer is remarkably small” and
both agree upon “the Secretariat’s ideological control over the judiciary.” Id. at 446.
44
KENPŌ, art. 76, para. 3. I maintain that the notion of judicial independence expressed in Article
76, “the exercise of … conscience,” fits plainly with Professor Lee Epstein’s conception, namely “the
ability of judges to behave sincerely, that is, in line with their sincerely held preferences (whatever they
may be).” Lee Epstein, Shedding (Empirical) Light on Judicial Selection, 74 MO. L. REV. 563, 567 n. 24
(2009); see also AHARON BARAK, THE JUDGE IN A DEMOCRACY, 76-80 (Princeton Univ. Press 2006).
Moreover, Epstein’s phrasing communicates that judges’ instrumental considerations of career
advancement (or survival) ought not to be embraced by the system.
45
While Tier 1 instrumental judicial administration should not impair judicial independence, it can
still impede fairness for the reasons discussed above.
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arise where judges consciously or unconsciously factor into their decisionmaking a desire to appease their bosses, those cases will suffer from some
impairment in the achievement of fairness as an element of procedural
justice.
In fact, “no one disputes that the Secretariat closely monitors judges’
performance for both competence and political reliability.”46 Beginning
with anecdotal stories that have been reported even in English writings for at
least twenty years47 and through the influential empirical analysis that Mark
Ramseyer and his co-authors have carried out, 48 the evidence is clear.
Scholars have shown conclusively how Japan’s judicial administrators
employ their powers over assignments, transfers, promotion, and retention to
pursue a distinct set of ideological values in Japanese case law.49
Again, we begin with formal structures, and within these,
assignments, transfer, and promotion are handled somewhat differently from
retention.
Both according to the Constitution and by statute, authority over
assignment, transfer, and promotion is at first entrusted to the Supreme
Court. Thus, Article 77 of the Constitution provides, “[t]he Supreme Court
is vested with the rulemaking power under which it determines . . . matters
relating to . . . the administration of judicial affairs.”50 Articles 47 and 48
of the Court Act implement this more specifically, albeit with constraints on
the Supreme Court designed to ensure for lower court judges a degree of
status protection. After Article 47 provides “[j]udges of lower court shall
be assigned to positions by the Supreme Court,” Article 48 then limits this
somewhat by barring a judge from being removed, transferred, suspended
from performing his job, or having his salary reduced against his or her will

46

Upham, supra note 42, at 424.
Early reports appear to be HIROSHI ITOH, THE JAPANESE SUPREME COURT: CONSTITUTIONAL
POLICIES, 249-82 (Markus Weiner Pub. 1989); Miyazawa, supra note 31; Percy R. Luney, Jr., The
Judiciary: Its Organization and Status in the Parliamentary System, in JAPANESE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
123 (Percy R. Luney, Jr. & Kazuyuki Takahashi eds., Univ. of Tokyo Press 1993); Abe, supra note 17.
48
Just to mention the leading works in this oeuvre, see J. MARK RAMSEYER & FRANCES MCCALL
ROSENBLUTH, JAPAN'S POLITICAL MARKETPLACE (rev. ed., Harvard Univ. Press 1997); MEASURING
JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE, supra note 16; Managed Judges, supra note 19; J. Mark Ramseyer, Predicting
Court Outcomes through Political Preferences: The Japanese Supreme Court and the Chaos of 1993, 58
DUKE L. J. 1557 (2009).
49
See, e.g., sources cited supra notes 46-48; see also Haley, supra note 18; Law, supra note 25.
50
KENPŌ, art. 77 (“The Supreme Court is vested with the rule-making power under which it
determines the rules of procedure and of practice, and of matters relating to attorneys, the internal
discipline of the courts and the administration of judicial affairs. Public procurators shall be subject to the
rule-making power of the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court may delegate the power to make rules for
inferior courts to such courts.”).
47
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except in certain procedurally protected situations. 51 As to retention,
reappointments are legally the same as new appointments, that is to say
carried out by the Cabinet “from a list of persons nominated by the Supreme
Court.”52
For all of these activities, the “who” and “how” is more fluid. Once
again, the formal authority to act in the name of the Supreme Court is given
to the collective body of the fifteen justices operating as a Judicial Assembly
with the Chief Justice serving as its chair. 53 However, while formal
authority remains in their hands, they have the wherewithal to pass along the
carrying out of necessary duties as they wish. The justices could, if they
chose to, pass along rulemaking authority (including personnel affairs) to the
lower courts. 54 Instead, the Supreme Court’s General Secretariat has
received the judiciary’s portfolio over all personnel affairs.55 Because the
Judicial Assembly exercises almost no voice,56 the General Secretariat’s
power is nearly complete.
This is where the rubber hits the road. With the power to control the
professional lives of every single full-time career judge apart from Supreme
51

Saibanshohō [Court Act], Law No. 59 of 1947, art. 48 (“A judge shall not be removed or be
transferred, or be suspended from performing his job, or have his salary reduced, against his will, except in
accordance with the provisions of law concerning public impeachment or national referendum, or unless
the judge is declared mentally or physically incompetent to perform his/her duties in accordance with
provisions of applicable law.”); but see Law, supra note 25, at 1557 n.63 (citing multiple sources uniformly
indicating that the protection of Article 48 is a façade if an individual judge does not wish to accept a
proposed transfer).
52
KENPŌ, art. 80; Saibanshohō [Court Act], Law No. 59 of 1947, art. 40; see also sources cited
supra notes 46-48; sources cited infra note 63 (noting the limited change which has resulted from the new
Lower Court Judge Designation Consultation Commissions); Haley, supra note 18; Law, supra note 25.
53
In this delegation to the Judicial Assembly, the law is entirely explicit: “(1) The Supreme Court
shall execute judicial administration affairs through deliberations of the Judicial Assembly and under the
general supervision of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. (2) The Judicial Assembly shall consist of
all Justices, and the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall be the chairperson.” Saibanshohō [Court
Act], Law No. 59 of 1947, art. 12.
54
KENPŌ, art. 77, para. 3 (“The Supreme Court may delegate the power to make rules for inferior
courts to such courts.”). As discussed infra, Professor Eiji Sasada has suggested decentralizing personnel
authority into the Judicial Assemblies of each of Japan’s eight High Courts and away from the General
Secretariat in the Supreme Court. See text and sources cited infra note 216.
55
And, in particular, it is the Personal Affairs Bureau of the General Secretariat that has complete
control over these matters. Thus, “according to one experienced observer of the Japanese judiciary . . . the
most influential official may in fact be the Director of the PAB.” Law, supra note 25, at 1563 (citing
interview with Shinichi Nishikawa, Professor, Meiji University, in Tokyo, Japan (Aug. 20, 2008)).
56
As one retired Supreme Court Justice has recalled, Judicial Assembly decisions are mere
formalities, where proposals put forward by the General Secretariat are given rubber stamp approvals.
“There is no one-by-one concrete explanation received as to personnel transfers pertaining to more than
several hundred people each year. And even if we had received [separate explanations], we couldn’t
make judgments on them.” EIJI SASADA, SHIHŌ NO HENYŌ TO KEMPŌ [TRANFORMATION OF JUSTICE AND
THE CONSTITUTION OF JAPAN] 42 (2008) (quoting MASAO OHNO, BENGOSHI KARA SAIBANKAN E [FROM
LAWYER TO JUDGE] 102 (Yuhikaku Pub. Co. 2000)).
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Court justices, the judicial administrators in the Personal Affairs Bureau
have and exercise the license to incentivize judicial decision-making that
conforms to their values, to punish judicial making that confronts their
values,57 and even to disempower58 or remove entirely judges who refuse to
toe the line.59 In Professor Mark Ramseyer’s words, this represents a
“managed judges” system of lower court judges who lack independence.
“They are free of direct control by politicians, but the Supreme Court and
Secretariat control their careers.”60 Or, in Professor David Law’s succinct
conclusion: “the prevailing view among observers is that Japanese judges
march out of ideological sync with the bureaucracy at their own peril.”61
For Japanese judges, not every case has “big brother” watching over
their shoulder to assess the ideological conformity of their decisions. The
vast majority of cases that judges resolve have little or no political or

57
Carrots and sticks are shaped by the range of available posts in terms of location, authority, and
subject matter, which are also connected to status and pay. Japanese career judges are rotated around the
entire nation every two to four years. Judges take on a variety of portfolios on the bench as well as in
dispatches to executive branch agencies. The most prestigious assignments are well recognized as judicial
administration posts, Tokyo and Osaka courts, and a handful of particular government posts. Nearly all
judges will take on the shared burden of less desirable posts, but the salient point is that some judges’
careers are mainly filled with attractive positions while others will have more, or even mostly, undesirable
situations.
58
By essentially banishing them to obscure branch court locations or less significant portfolios such
as specialized panels for checks and notes or civil execution of judgments, and with the likelihood that this
will inspire a voluntary departure. Levin interview with former Judge A [place concealed], [date
concealed] [hereinafter Judge A interview]; see also Law, supra note 25, at 1561 (“ . . . reassigning judges
on a periodic basis has been effective tool for encouraging those who are too independent or too liberal to
quit.”).
59
Id. John Haley emphatically reminds us that only one assistant judge has been denied
reappointment for blatantly political reasons in the post-war history of the judiciary. Moreover, this
incident involving Yasuaki Miyamoto generated a massive outcry from the practicing bar, making the
judiciary “the center of a political storm.” Haley, supra note 18, at 126. Accordingly, Haley insists that
a lesson was forever learned by the Supreme Court not to employ this sanction again because it is “no
longer viable.” Id. However, his surmise is not entirely persuasive. Because the General Secretariat
has a diverse collection of mechanisms, some more subtle and some more blunt, it does not need to use all
of the arrows in its quiver to strike fear. Some may be most effective held in reserve, while more
“conventional” options are put to use. As well, this mechanism will ordinarily be unnecessary when
“[p]ay raises, transfers, promotion/demotion and other such personnel matters are likely have much greater
practical significance than the ten-year reappointment reviews.” Foote, supra note 20, at 154; accord,
Judge A interview, supra note 58.
60
Managed Judges, supra note 19, at 1924. Ramseyer views the system approvingly in light of its
powerful capacity to create consistency in the law: “As with academic freedom for professors, judicial
independence is romantic and comfortable, but not a policy destined to encourage intense effort or strict
accountability.” Id. at 1925-26; but see text infra at 109-113 (noting problems with instrumental judicial
administration regardless of potential benefits).
61
Law, supra note 25, at 1562. Law also reminds readers of Professor Setsuo Miyazawa’s even
more strident remarks: “Japanese judges . . . ‘assignments depend more upon the policy content of their
decisions and their outside activities than upon their legal-reasoning skills or ability to dispose of cases
efficiently.’” Id. at n.105 (citing Miyazawa, supra note 31, at 50-52).
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ideological significance whatsoever.62 Moreover, judicial authorities must
understand that their interventions must be both subtle and relatively scarce,
as too much exposure would allow the legitimacy of the system to become
subject to challenge.63 But at the same time, surely Japanese lower court
judges understand the game. After all, any servant is wise to understand
her master’s wishes.
While anecdotal reports had loosely illuminated the hot spots,
Ramseyer and Rasmusen’s statistical work more precisely identifies the
types of cases most likely to draw the wrath of the General Secretariat if
decided contrary to its values.64 In civil litigation, they found that “judges
who held either the Self-Defense Force or United States military bases
unconstitutional, judges who rejected national electoral apportionment
schemes advantageous to the Liberal Democratic Party, and judges who
enjoined the national government in administrative law suits” all suffered in
their careers.65 On the other hand, in mundane administrative litigation
involving disputes between the government and taxpayers, the system favors
accurate judges rather than biased judges.
Thus, here lies instrumental judicial administration in plain form—
with implications for civil and administrative cases that raise the most
significant issues challenging the state. As one former judge explained to
62

Critical legal studies scholars might object to this characterization. See, e.g., Allan C.
Hutchinson & Patrick J. Monahan, Law, Politics, and the Critical Legal Scholars: The Unfolding Drama of
American Legal Thought, 36 STAN. L. REV. 199, 206 (1984) (“Law [for critical legal scholars] is simply
politics dressed in different garb; it neither operates in a historical vacuum nor does it exist independently
of ideological struggles in society.”). For our purposes, that perspective, even if accurate, digs too deeply.
Some cases which directly challenge the most significant interests of political elites will accordingly be of
greater interest to them.
63
The system did face a degree of public investigation through the course of the Judicial Reform
Council’s endeavors. As with initial judicial appointments, a limited framework of external review for
reappointment was established through the Lower Court Judge Designation Consultation Commissions
discussed above. However, just as with initial appointments, the Commission’s effectiveness in bringing
about real change seems to be quite limited in scope.
In any case, “pay raises, transfers,
promotion/demotion and other such personnel matters likely have much greater practical significance than
the ten-year reappointment reviews. These other personnel matters lie beyond the scope of the
Consultation Commission’s review.” Foote, supra note 20, at 154.
64
Japanese judges may also be punished for activities off the bench. The most famous case in this
regard is the Teranishi case, where Judge Kazushi Teranishi received a formal reprimand, when after
identifying himself as an assistant judge at Sendai District Court at a symposium on the topic, he conveyed
his opposition to a wiretap authorization bill pending in the national legislature. Daniel H. Foote,
Restrictions on Political Activity by Judges in Japan and the United States: The Cases of Judge Teranishi
and Justice Sanders, 8 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 285, 286-89 (2009); see also Kazushi Teranishi,
Sendai Kōsai Kaikoku Kettei Wo Ukete [On Receiving the Reprimand Decision from the Sendai District
Court] 47-53, in TOSHIKI ODANAKA ET AL., JIYŪ NO NAI NIHON NO SAIBANKAN [JAPAN’S JUDGES WHO
ARE NOT FREE] (Nihon Hyoronsha1998); see also DANIEL H. FOOTE, NA MO NAI KAO MO NAI SHIHŌ:
NIHON NO SAIBAN WA KAWARU NO KA [NAMELESS FACELESS JUSTICE: WILL JAPAN’S COURTS CHANGE?]
(Tamaruya Masayuki trans., NTT Pub. Co. 2007).
65
MEASURING JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE, supra note 16, at 62.
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me, all judges will intimately consider their personal career implications in
the event that fortune delivers to them a politically significant case. And
while politically significant cases are relatively few over the course of a
judge’s career, it was “simply obvious” which cases would be most likely to
matter to the General Secretariat.66 In such cases, Japan’s judges are of
course “free” to decide as they think best. But as they weigh over the
implications of their choice, taking into account how it will likely affect their
careers, their lives, and their families, it seems fair to say that the scale of
justice for the litigants is not poised in an even balance.
3.

Tier 3: Judicial Conferences, Study Groups, and Internal Position
Papers

With its unified administrative system, the Japanese judiciary is
exceedingly capable of working from the center to proselytize particular
approaches to litigation procedures or to interpretations of the law. In fact,
this is precisely the intended meaning of “research” in the Japan’s Legal
Training and Research Institute’s name.67
This managed distribution of legal understanding to all active judges
is carried out in a variety of practices. In its most formal setting, the
General Secretariat, on behalf of the Supreme Court, convenes judicial
conferences (kyōgikai /協議会)68 where a designated representative from
each of the eight High Courts and fifty District Courts69 will be brought in
to Tokyo to discuss some particular subject matter, sometimes to assist in
developing an internal position paper on that subject to be distributed by the
Supreme Court to all judges.70 Less formally and more frequently, the
Legal Training and Research Institute hosts study groups (benkyōkai /勉強

66

Judge A interview, supra note 58.
“[T]he Institute provides the advanced education for judges and assists their research programs on
law and practice.” SUPREME COURT OF JAPAN, JUSTICE IN JAPAN 38 (6th ed., Hōsō Kai [Lawyer’s
Association] 2000); see generally SUPREME COURT OF JAPAN, THE LEGAL TRAINING AND RESEARCH
INSTITUTE OF JAPAN (Hōsō Kai [Lawyer’s Association] 2001).
68
These should be distinguished from the judicial assemblies (saibankan kaigi /裁判官会議) which
are the governing bodies of each court. Saibanshohō [Court Act], Law No. 59 of 1947, art. 12(1)
(Supreme Court Judicial Assembly), art. 20(1) (High Court Judicial Assemblies), art. 29(2) (District Court
Judicial Assemblies).
69
Typically a judge with some expertise in that field. Judge A interview, supra note 58.
70
Id. Judge A further explained to me that he participated as the representative from his court in
one such conference. While opinions were gathered at the conference, it seemed to him that the views to
be expressed in a position paper were predetermined by the General Secretariat administrators who had
convened the conference and in fact those were what ultimately resulted.
67
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会) of invited judges with expertise in particular subject matters to meet and
discuss those issues.71
For the most part, this aspect of Japanese judicial administration
attracts and deserves praise.72 However, these mechanisms nonetheless
present a risk of being carried out in a manner that is aimed at putting bias
into fair litigation results, which is to say they risk being employed as a
means of instrumental judicial administration.
The danger lies in the risk that ostensibly advisory guidance on how
cases should be resolved may take on a binding force in light of the General
Secretariat’s Tier 2 collection of carrots and sticks. Thus for example,
Professor Setsuo Miyazawa tells of the public exposure of a formerly
confidential internal court document that had been circulated by the General
Secretariat to both district and high courts in March 1985 which:
[C]ontained a record of the conference of District and High
Court judges that the Supreme Court held in December, 1983.
The topic of the discussion was the responsibility of the
government in cases where floods have been caused by
negligence and management of rivers. Its timing was telling.
The conference was held only a month before the Supreme
Court decision that severely limited the governmental
responsibility in such cases. It appears that the [General
Secretariat] tried to inform the lower court judges of the
probable contents of the imminent Supreme Court decision and
to encourage the attending judges to decide their cases
accordingly.73
71
Some years ago, I enjoyed a private tour of the Legal Training and Research Institute, hosted by
the director of its research division. During my visit, I observed two week-long study sessions in progress,
each with about fifty judges participating. One was focused on issues related to medical malpractice and
the other on intellectual property. Speakers included judges, lawyers, and scholars, but the audience was
made up only of judges.
72
Professor Daniel Foote and others provide detail describing an active study session program
carried out by the Tokyo District Court in the early 1960s which they attribute to helping simplify and add
predictability to the resolution of traffic accident disputes. Foote presumes the acquiescence of the
Supreme Court and suggests further that the General Secretariat may have suggested it in the first place.
In any case, “the Supreme Court later aided the process in many ways, including convening meetings of
judges to discuss relevant topics and coordinating transfers of judges in an apparent effort to spread
expertise on traffic cases nationwide.” Daniel H. Foote, Resolution of Traffic Accident Disputes and
Judicial Activism in Japan, 25 L. IN JAPAN 19, 32 (1995); see also J. Mark Ramseyer & Minoru Nakazato,
The Rational Litigant: Settlement Amounts And/or the Rates in Japan, 18 J. LEG. STUD. 263 (1989);
Takao Tanase, The Management of Disputes: Automobile Accident Compensation in Japan, 24 L. & SOC.
REV. 651 (1990).
73
Miyazawa, supra note 31, at 52-53. Miyazawa also cites conferences held in Tokyo in 1976 and
1982 with regards to third-party standing in administrative litigation against the government. Id. at 53;
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According to Professor Miyazawa and drawing upon work by
Professor Shigeo Kisa, the nature of these conferences has “changed much
since they started in the fifties.”74 Sessions that were once informal and
transparent had taken on the character of indoctrination meetings under the
General Secretariat’s firm hand.75 And the General Secretariat’s views
were delivered in the context of a commonly understood but unspoken
enforcement regime centered around transfers and promotions.76
Not surprisingly, the Supreme Court’s doctrinal communications are
also distributed on paper. As explained by Professor Eiji Sasada:
Even apart from the judicial councils and conferences77 that are
managed by guidance from the Supreme Court General
Secretariat, there are many written materials that the Supreme
Court circulates which extend its influence upon the judges of
the lower courts . . . . Despite that these pertain to important
matters, “memoranda” from the various bureau chiefs of the
Supreme Court General Secretariat “have a nature to them
suggesting that they must be followed by the lower courts.”78
In short, reliable reports suggest that judicial position papers and
conferences, while serving laudable purposes in helping carry out judicial
administration, have at times crossed the line into instrumental judicial
administration practices that warrant concern. When, for example, central
judicial administrators who lack authority in deciding particular cases
present to lower courts didactic guidance to narrowly construe standing
requirements so as to bar certain plaintiff’s actions against the government,
the administrators are plainly taking sides in such cases and impeding the
fairness of the system.

see also RAMSEYER & ROSENBLUTH, supra note 48, at 176 (“the Supreme Court held a judicial conference
to show judges how to decide [the state’s liability in river flooding] cases.).
74
Id. at 53 (citing Shigeo Kisa, Professionalism and Independence of Judges, 40 (1) HOKUDAI
HOGAKU RONSHU [HOKKAIDO UNIV. L. REV.] 5-6 (1990)).
75
Id.
76
Id. (“Attending lower-court judges know the weight of such opinions and convey them to their
colleagues after they return. Lower-court judges know what will happen to their career if they defy GS
policies and many attending judges now consider these conferences as chances to ask the GS to tell them
about its policies.”).
77
The name Judicial Councils (saibankan kaidō /裁判官会同) has since been replaced by Judicial
Conferences (saibankkan kyōgikai/裁判官協議会). In function and practice, they essentially describe the
same kind of meetings. Judge A interview, supra note 58.
78
EIJI SASADA, SAIBAN SEIDŌ [THE COURT SYSTEM] 243-44 (Shinzansha Pub. Co. 1997) (quoting
Nobuyoshi Asami, Towards the Reform of the Organization and Organizational Culture of the Courts
(Part 1), 1465 HANREI JIHŌ 29, 32 (1993)).
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Tier 4: Direct Interventions

Instrumental judicial administration via direct intervention is its most
troubling form. Such cases represent clear and unambiguous meddling by
judicial administrators in the “fair and balanced” 79 litigation system
intended by its designers. Fortunately, direct intervention in Japan appears
to be a rare occurrence.80 Although further investigation is certainly called
for to flesh out the degree to which such incidents have occurred and are
occurring, it hardly seems that the system is routinely impaired in this
manner.81
Accordingly, I have found only three stories that present or strongly
suggest82 direct intervention in actual cases in Japan. The first is wellknown and well-documented even in English language writings on Japanese
law. It conspicuously reveals how judicial administrators dealt with the
involved judges by favoring the intervener and punishing a whistle-blower.
Two less familiar stories lack smoking guns, but bolster the views of those
who worry about instrumental judicial administration in suspect
circumstances. One is recounted by Professor Setsuo Miyazawa in a wellrecognized article in the Kobe University Law Review. The other is most
likely being presented for the first time here.
The first is the famous case of Sapporo District Court Judge Shigeo
Fukushima, who, while presiding over one of the most significant cases of
constitutional law regarding war and peace in Japan in the late 1960s (at
least comparable to the U.S. Guantánamo Bay litigation in the past decade, if
not even more significant for Japan then),83 received a letter from the chief
79

Cf. FOXNEWS.COM, http://www.foxnews.com (“Fair & Balanced” all the time).
However, it needs to be pointed out that the “need” for such interventions would also likely be
quite rare. To begin with, as noted above, very few cases will warrant central judicial administrators’
interest in the results. Then, whether as the result of Tier 1’s screening process that fills the courts with
judges who will likely share the administrators’ views, or owing to Tier 2-type pressures on the deciding
judges being sufficient to allow the administrators sufficient comfort in anticipating compliant results, or
simply that the likely results in the case, resolved fairly, point in the same direction as administrators’ hope
for, these dynamics further reduce the administrators’ worries. Consequently, the system already ensures
that only a tiny fraction of cases will ever invite direct intervention from the central administrators.
81
Albeit a sample of n=1, Judge A neither experienced nor heard of any such interventions during
his time on the bench. Judge A interview, supra note 58. Another possibility is that the rarity is mainly
owing to the dynamics explained in note 80, supra. Thus even if interventions are numerically few, the
odds of direct intervention may still be unacceptably high in those cases where judicial administrators
would want to put it to use.
82
Anyone who has spent time around infants knows the “dirty diaper sniff test.” Sometimes we
may assume a reliable call on what’s happened, even when we can’t see what’s inside.
83
The significance of this case is demonstrated by the fact that five percent of all lawyers in Japan
signed on as co-counsel for the plaintiffs. This reality corresponds to imagining 55,000 United States
lawyers joining Harry Schneider and the Perkins Coie law firm in representing Salim Ahmed Hamdan pro
80
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judge of the Sapporo district, Kenta Hiraga, that offered “friendly advice
from a senior colleague.” The advice shared why Hiraga thought the
government’s position in the case should be upheld and how the rationale
could be circumspectly crafted. When Fukushima held instead for the
plaintiffs, he also went public with the memo. This raised clamor from
many quarters, but ultimately Chief Judge Hiraga was “reprimanded” with a
promotion while Judge Fukushima was sternly admonished and then posted
to various provincial cities for a period of twelve years before he ultimately
resigned from the courts.84
The second story is presented in Professor Miyazawa’s words:
In 1979, the banks of the Nagara River in Gifu Prefecture were
broken under heavy rain and the towns of Anpachi and
Sunomata were flooded. Residents of the two towns filed
separate civil suits in Gifu District Court against the
government seeking damages as the Nagara river was… under
the management of the national government. The two cases
were heard at different times by the same section of the Gifu
court, but the court reached opposing conclusions. While the
court decided for the Anpachi plaintiff in 1982, it decided
against the Sunomata plaintiffs in 1984. The associate judges
of the two decisions were the same, but the chief judge was
different. Chief Judge Akimoto in the Anpachi decision was
replaced by Chief Judge Watanabe in 1982, the same year as
the Anpachi decision. Watanabe’s background is the point.
He worked for five years between 1975 and 1980 as a solicitor
at the Justice Ministry headquarters, finally at the rank of none
other than the head of administrative litigation.85
bono against the Bush Administration’s military commissions in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. See Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
84
The story is retold in many sources. For its (most likely) earliest English language retelling in
print, see Yasuhei Taniguchi, Japan, in JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE 205, 215-16 (S. Shetreet and J.
Deschenes eds., Martinus Nijhoff 1985); ITOH, supra note 47, at 266-68. See also, e.g., MEASURING
JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE, supra note 16, at 18-22; David M. O'Brien & Yasuo Ohkoshi, Stifling Judicial
Independence from Within: The Japanese Judiciary, in JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN THE AGE OF
DEMOCRACY: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES FROM AROUND THE WORLD 37, 48-49 (Peter H. Russell & David M.
O'Brien eds., Univ. of Virginia Press 2001); Luney, supra note 47, at 142-43; Haley, supra note 18, at 12324. In Japanese, see FUKUSHIMA SHIGEO ET AL., NAGANUMA JIKEN HIRAGA SHOKAN: 35 NEN ME NO
SHŌGEN [THE NAGANUMA CASE AND THE HIRAGA MEMO: THIRTY FIVE YEARS’ OF BEARING WITNESS]
(Fukushima Shigeo et al. eds., Nihon Hyoronsha 2009); see also FOOTE, supra note 64, at 127-30.
85
Miyazawa, supra note 31, at 51-52. Miyazawa additionally notes that Judge Watanabe’s transfer
to the Gifu District Court was further unusual because he had been serving at the more prestigious Tokyo
High Court and that he returned to a prestigious track of postings in 1986. On the other hand, after ruling
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Finally, a present-day story, based in part upon the author’s personal
knowledge, displays a consistent modus operandi.86
On May 15, 1998, seven plaintiffs diagnosed with terminal lung
cancer filed suit for damages in the Tokyo District Court against the
government of Japan and Japan Tobacco, Inc., (JT) the privatized successor
to the Japan Tobacco and Salt Monopoly Public Corporation. Though
Japan has no mechanism for class action, this was nonetheless an
unprecedented case in Japan as the first serious challenge to the business of
selling tobacco to the Japanese public which had been wholly owned by the
national government until 1985 and which was still two-thirds owned by the
nation through its Minister of Finance.87 Given that the case concerned
tobacco smoking, then prevalent among one third of all Japanese adults,88 if
the plaintiffs prevailed with compensatory damages for the disability and
anticipated loss of lives from their diseases, the precedent would have been
set for millions of similar claims against the state and JT.
After months of pre-trial sessions, the trial continued before a panel of
three career judges in ordinary piecemeal sessions over a four-year period.
All of the plaintiffs testified to share stories of their smoking, their disease,
and their suffering. Some passed away from their disease while the
proceedings were still in progress. As well, the judges heard key officials
from the government and some of JT’s top executives give their direct
testimony and face challenging cross-examinations. A tremendous amount
of information had been prepared and conveyed by all parties in the
litigation to make the judges intimately familiar with the facts and legal
issues in the case. One can certainly presume the judges had formed
against the government, Judge Akimoto’s career track was to less attractive posts. Miyazawa plainly
states that the General Secretariat appears to make assignments “in order to get a desired result in a
particular case at a local court” having effectively used information about important cases that lower court
judges are required to submit to it. Id. at 51 (emphasis added). Ramseyer and co-author Frances
Rosenbluth recite this story with greater detail and add a similar story from the Fukuoka High Court,
hinting that the Secretariat and local senior judges may “use the personnel apparatus to fix the outcome of
controversial cases” but conceding this is “harder to prove.” RAMSEYER & ROSENBLUTH, supra note 48,
at 175-78 (1993). It should also be noted that case assignments within any particular court are purportedly
random, although the system is utterly opaque and not bound by any publicly available rules. Sasada
interview, supra note 22.
86
I was present in the courtroom in December 2002 and attended a debriefing session with plaintiffs’
counsel later that afternoon. Unless specifically cited differently, additional facts in this recitation are
based upon an interview with Ritsu Katayama, lead counsel for plaintiffs in the Yokohama trial. See
Interview with Ritsu Katayama, in Tokyo, Japan (June 3, 2010) [hereinafter Katayama interview].
87
Mark Levin, Tobacco Industrial Policy and Tobacco Control Policy in Japan, 6 ASIAN-PAC. L. &
POL. J. 45, 49 (2005); see also Mark A. Levin, Smoke Around the Rising Sun: An American Look at
Tobacco Regulation in Japan, 8 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 99 (1997); Eric A. Feldman, The Culture of Legal
Change: A Case Study of Tobacco Control in Twenty-First Century Japan, 27 MICH. J. INT'L L. 743 (2006).
88
JAPAN
TOBACCO,
INC.,
ANNUAL
REPORT
104
(2005),
http://www.jti.com/documents/annualreports/annurep2005.
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personal opinions drawn from dozens of hours of live testimony that they
had heard.89
The case was beginning to wind down. Nearly all of the evidence
had been presented to the court and the session on December 10, 2002 was
set for the plaintiffs’ attorneys to present a written submission translated
from a United States law professor’s published article on the history of
tobacco business and policy in Japan,90 to be followed by a scheduling
conference for the remaining sessions of the trial. At the time, it was
anticipated that the plaintiffs’ and defendants’ closing arguments would go
through the Spring of 2003 and judgment handed down that Fall.
The parties, their legal counsel, and an audience of spectators waited
in the courtroom for the session to begin. The bailiff called for those in
attendance to rise and the judges entered. But there was a surprising
occurrence. The presiding judge had been replaced with a new judge,
Kikuo Asaka,91 who, as the day went on, seemed far less sympathetic to the
plaintiffs’ position. Adding to the surprise was that the change had taken
place in December, asynchronous from the ordinary annual shift of many
judicial personnel assignments that takes place with each new fiscal year on
April 1.92
Thus, for reasons unknown to the plaintiffs and their lawyers, judicial
administrators in the Supreme Court's General Secretariat had chosen to
replace the presiding judge with a total newcomer quite suddenly.93 Later
that afternoon, plaintiffs’ lawyers confided to their clients that these
89

Oral testimony was presented in twenty trial sessions over the course of four years. Yoshio
Isayama, Kesshin Chokuzen no Saibankan Kōtai no Imi Suru Mono [The Meaning of the Judicial Transfer
Just Prior to the Close of Trial Proceedings], 1 NIHON KIN’EN GAKKAI ZASSHI [JAPANESE J. TOBACCO
CONTROL STUD.] 3 (2006).
90
The article was Levin, supra note 87, translated to Japanese by the plaintiffs’ legal team.
91
First appointed in April 1977, Judge Asaka was a fifteen-year veteran on the bench. He was
posted to the Tokyo District Court with an elite supervisory level status in April 2002. ZEN SAIBANKAN
KEIREKI SŌRAN [OVERVIEW OF CAREERS OF ALL JAPANESE JUDGES] 192 (Nihon Minshu Horitsuka Kyokai
[Japan Democratic Lawyers' Ass'n] ed., 4 ban [4th ed.] 2004) [hereinafter KEIREKI SŌRAN].
92
Mid-year transfers in Japan are not entirely uncommon. A small number of judges exit the
system throughout the year owing to illness, sudden death, or the mandatory retirement of judges
designated by the Constitution article 79(5) and particularized in the Court Act Article 50, that takes effect
on their birthdays. Each departure then triggers a shift of Judge B to Judge A’s position, Judge C to Judge
B’s position, etc., and a chain reaction of multiple transfers like a set of falling dominoes. Annual April 1
transfers, at the start of each new fiscal year, represent a card shuffle. Given that judges are transferred on
average every three to four years, April shuffles will inevitably include a substantial percent of the entire
judiciary. Judge A interview, supra note 58.
93
Looking back, Yoshio Isayama, lead counsel for the plaintiffs in the Tokyo litigation, notes that
after forty years of losing cases, plaintiffs had just begun to win major damage awards against the tobacco
industry in the United States. Such circumstances would have been known to the judges in Japan and may
have given administrators pause to imagine a similar ruling being handed down in the Tokyo case.
Isayama, supra note 89, at 3.
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circumstances did not bode well for the end results, but regrettably nothing
could be done.
Shortly thereafter, both of the other original judges were replaced in
the regular April transfer season. And thus the case was to be decided by a
panel of judges who were all new to the matter and who had heard not any
of the live witness examination and cross-examinations. The “right-hand”
judge94 was even new to the bench—a very rare occasion in Japan of a midcareer appointment from the practicing bar.95 This individual, Kuniyo
Mizuno, had until then made his professional career in medical malpractice
and workers’ compensation litigation. As he had become a judge just six
months earlier,96 this case was one of his first assignments.
On October 21, 2003, a defense judgment was handed down that was
far-reaching in both its fact finding and holdings of law. The decision
rejected nearly all of the plaintiffs’ epidemiological evidence as incapable of
causally showing harm caused by tobacco smoking and severely downplayed
the addictiveness of nicotine.97
The decision was signed by all three judges, but by the commonly
understood reckoning of the Japanese judicial process, the leading force in
the decision would have been the presiding judge. Meanwhile, the chief
draftsperson of the ruling was presumably the “right-hand” judge, Judge
Mizuno, the newcomer just arrived on the bench from a medical law
practice.98
We fast-forward the story. In January 2005, a new set of plaintiffs
filed Japan’s second major tobacco products liability case in Yokohama
District Court. Again, several years of trial proceedings were carried out
with live testimony of the stricken plaintiffs and their various experts.
Representatives for the defendants again faced blistering cross-examination.
The plaintiffs’ lawyers had been pleased with the process in the court under
94
By tradition even from feudal Japan, the “right-hand” judge (migi baiseki) sits to the right of the
presiding judge (when viewed from the presiding judge’s perspective) and is the next-most senior to the
presiding judge. The junior-most judge sits on the presiding judge’s left (hidari baiseiki).
95
Although there were just under 2000 career judges on the bench, “[i]n the 11 years from 1992
through 2002, only 39 judges and 10 assistant judges were appointed from among practicing lawyers.”
Thus, Judge Mizuno’s attainment of a full-judicial appointment was among an average of less than four per
year and his entry was obtained by less than 2.5% of all Japanese judges at the time. Foote, supra note 20,
at 135 (statistics on mid-career appointments); Haley, supra note 18, at 101 (total number of judges).
96
Traveling a rarely taken path, Judge Mizuno became a judge in June 2002 after fifteen years as a
licensed attorney. KEIREKI SŌRAN, supra note 91, at 196.
97
Araki et al. v. Japan Tobacco, Japan, et al., No. (WA) 10379, Tokyo District Court, unpublished
final decision, Oct. 21, 2003 (copy on file with author).
98
On June 22, 2005, the Tokyo High Court upheld the Tokyo District Court decision nearly
verbatim; and after rejection of an appeal to the Supreme Court, that judgment became final on January 26,
2006.
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Presiding Judge Miki, whom they understood to have a fine and fair
reputation well-recognized among practicing lawyers. And yet in April
2008, just a few months before witness testimony in the trial was set to
conclude, Judge Miki and both of the other judges on the panel were
replaced ensemble.99 The junior-most position went to a brand-new young
member of the judiciary, Makiko Nakajima. The new “right-hand” judge
was Masatoshi Miyasaka, who had spent two years seconded to the Health
Policy Section of the Ministry of Health early in his career and more
recently, had served an elite posting inside the Supreme Court's research
section where he had the lead responsibility for putting together the
Supreme Court’s dismissal of the earlier Tokyo litigation.100 Moreover, the
new presiding judge was no one other than Judge Mizuno.101 On January
20, 2010, this panel handed down a defense verdict, as to which the
plaintiffs filed for appeal on February 1.
The data set here is both small and ambiguous. Some may see this
as the tip of the iceberg, hinting at a larger mass of unacceptable
interventions that lies hidden beneath the surface.102 Others may see things
more benignly, with the Hiraga memorandum being aberrational, unlikely to
99

As Judge Miki had been appointed to the Yokohama District Court in 2003, he was ripe for
transfer in April 2008. However, being from Yokohama and on his third posting there, it appears to have
been his location of choice and it would have been equally feasible for him to stay longer. KEIREKI
SŌRAN, supra note 91, at 202.
100
Appointed April 1988, Judge Miyasaka’s time at the Ministry of Health was from April 1993 to
April 1995. KEIREKI SŌRAN, supra note 91, at 246. For a reporting of Judge Miyasaka’s role at the
Supreme Court, (tantō chōsakan / 担当調査官), see Kokumin no Kōsei na Saiban wo Ukeru Kenri wo
Motomeru Moshi-ire [Demand for “the People’s Right to Access the Courts”], Kenji Mizuno et al. (Sup.
Ct.; Yokohama D. Ct. April 22, 2008), www.nosmoke55.jp/action/0804yokohama_sosyou.html (in
Japanese). For essential background reading, see Law, supra note 25, at 1579-86 (explaining the
operations and jurisprudential methods of Supreme Court chōsakan).
101
Plaintiffs and their supporters bluntly expressed their frustrations in an open letter to Supreme
Court Chief Justice Shimada and the Yokohama District Court Chief Judge Abe: “After these transfers, it
is easy to imagine that Chief Judge Mizuno and right-hand Judge Miyasaka, drawing from their previous
experiences, would have predisposed opinions with regards to tobacco illness litigation. Moreover, we,
together with the general public, have come to suspect that ‘the Supreme Court, having gotten wind of the
developments in the Yokohama tobacco illness litigation, intentionally devised a counter plan using judicial
personnel affairs in favor of [defendants] JT and the state.’” Mizuno et al., supra note 100.
102
See, e.g., Miyazawa, supra note 31; see also ITOH, supra note 47, at 270 (“In view of a strict
confidentiality required of judicial decision-making in a courtroom, it is not possible to verify any actual
influence in a specific case. However, a potential influence can be inferred from the revelation in the
Hiraga memorandum of the Missile Base case and Judge Iimori's remarks alluding to similar practices
among some judges.”). Professor Itoh does not give any citation for Judge Iimori's remarks, but explains
the story more fully. Id. at 267. There, Itoh explains that Judge Iimori had been Chief Judge of the
Kagoshima District Court and being an outspoken hard-line conservative judge, he would have been
directly opposed to Judge Fukushima's left-leaning political views. Id. Nonetheless, Judge Iimori
published remarks in the Liberal Democratic Party's organizational newsletter in support of Judge
Fukushima, noting that the Hiraga memo was "by no means without precedent in judicial decisionmaking.” Id.
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be repeated in light of the public outcry that it provoked. As well, given
the routine transfers of judges in Japan, some mid-year and many every
April,103 it may be that the changes in judges in both the Nagara River dam
and the tobacco products liability litigation cases were strictly in the normal
course of affairs and entirely unrelated to the underlying litigation
circumstances. At the moment, we simply can not know for sure.
But at the very least, the above stories show that beliefs about direct
intervention via instrumental judicial administration bring out skepticism
regarding the fairness of the process among participants and scholarly
observers.104 Moreover, they reveal how the current system of centralized
judicial administration in Japan, in particular the General Secretariat’s black
box control over judicial transfers, makes instrumental interventions easily
accomplished, easily hidden, and provides few safeguards apart from an
obstinate message of “Trust us.”105
C.

Conclusion: Instrumental Judicial Administration’s Impact and
Meaning

Instrumental judicial administration in its various manifestations is
alive and well in Japan, or at least it has been through the post-war years.106
While there may be disagreement as to its precise manner, significance, or
social costs, nearly all writers agree that it lies out there in the real world of
civil litigation for social justice-related litigation.
Granted, instrumental judicial administration appears to arise in only a
narrow slice of cases, namely those of social or political significance of the
most interest to political elites.107 Correspondingly, in “the vast majority of
court cases, [which] in any modern society are mundane in the extreme,” the

103

See supra note 92.
See, e.g., Mizuno et al., supra note 100; Miyazawa, supra note 31; Isayama, supra note 89, at 1;
Taniguchi interview, supra note 21; Katayama interview, supra note 86; but see Sasada interview, supra
note 22, discussed infra (noting that circumstances in Japan in this regard have greatly improved over the
past decade).
105
The “Trust Us” slogan is Daniel Foote’s. See Foote, supra note 20, at 151.
106
Of course, Japan is hardly alone. See, e.g., Alan B. Morrison & D. Scott Stenhouse, The Chief
Justice of the United States: More than Just the Highest Ranking Judge, 1 CONST. COMMENT. 57, 61
(1984); Theodore W. Ruger, The Judicial Appointment Power of the Chief Justice, 7 U. PA. J. CONST. L.
341, 343, 391-94 (2004) (cited in Law, supra note 25, at 1590 n. 272).
107
Consider chemists’ elemental emission spectra that show light in small sets of fixed and distinct
lines, leaving most colors of visible light uninvolved. I would nominate Polonium or Actinium to
graphically portray instrumental judicial administration in Japan the best, as nearly all of their lines show
up on the left side of the picture. See Polonium, http://chemistry.bd.psu.edu/jircitano/Po.gif; Actinium,
http://chemistry.bd.psu.edu/jircitano/Ac.gif; see generally THEODORE GRAY, THE ELEMENTS: A VISUAL
EXPLORATION OF EVERY KNOWN ATOM IN THE UNIVERSE (Black Dog & Leventhal 2009).
104
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judiciary seems to be doing its job fairly and appropriately.108 Almost all
of Japan’s judges, almost all the time, do their jobs just as one would hope.
Nonetheless, I differ from those who choose to downplay the
significance of instrumental judicial administration.109 Neither benign110
or even laudable motivations or coincidental benefits111 can entirely justify
instrumental judicial administration. Unfairness seems to have been
present in cases that were fundamentally important to those who brought
them and important precisely when the losing party’s aims may be countermajoritarian and the courts are their principal means for seeking recourse.112
If the system is supposed to be fair,113 then it is supposed to be fair, plain
and simple.
And so now we turn to our next inquiry: What is the law on civil
procedural justice in Japan? If instrumental judicial administration is
skewing the results in a case or line of cases, what can be done?

108
See Managed Judges, supra note 19, at 1928. Work remains to more carefully assess the
frequency and degree that instrumental judicial administration has accomplished real effects before and
after the millennial judicial reform process was accomplished.
109
Most notably, id. My prioritization of fairness is admittedly subjective and personal, and it is
with the recognition that reasonable others can value fairness without placing it above consistency,
predictability, and institutional preservation in the judicial process. But this is not merely an outsider’s
perspective; views held by Japanese observers consonant with mine include Ohbuchi et al., supra note 20,
at 889, Miyazawa, supra note 31, SASADA, supra note 56, at 47, and Fukunaga, infra note 134.
110
See text and sources cited supra note 21 (instrumental judicial administration in Japan is not so
much motivated by personal ideological views of the administrators per se, but is motivated by, and
accomplishes an essential role as guardians protecting the autonomy of the judiciary from political
intrusion).
111
Such as improving the “quality” of judicial decision making or increasing the predictability of the
process. See, e.g, Managed Judges, supra note 19, at 1927. Or that it is reflective of “what the
electorate wants.” Id. at 1928. That litigation can be tied in with social movements is obvious, with
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) being perhaps the most famous example. But courts may
also often run ahead of the electorate in their understanding of minorities’ rights. See, e.g., Baehr v.
Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).
112
Even when social justice causes change through a broader movement strategy, litigation will often
have a key role. See, e.g., Mark A. Levin, Essential Commodities and Racial Justice: Using
Constitutional Protection of Japan’s Indigenous Ainu People to Inform Understandings of the United
States and Japan, 33 N.Y.U J. INT. L. & P. 419, 501-03 (2001) (Nibutani Dam litigation by Ainu people
used the courts as a “cultural performance” for a broader movement strategy); ERIC K. YAMAMOTO,
INTERRACIAL JUSTICE: CONFLICT & RECONCILIATION IN POST-CIVIL RIGHTS AMERICA 149 (1999)
(describing a “movement away from principal reliance on narrow judicial remedies towards the additional
use of the courts as forums for the development and expressions of counter-narratives and for promotion of
local empowerment and community control”).
113
See text and sources cited supra notes 6-10; see also Yamamoto, supra note 17, at 387
(“Litigation process is legitimized by procedures that ensure the effectuation of individual rights, that
recognize the significance of dignity and individual participation in the peaceful resolution of disputes, and
that foster a sense of fairness on the part of litigants and the public.”).
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III.

STANDARDS: LEGAL PROTECTIONS CONCERNING PROCEDURAL JUSTICE
AND THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION IN JAPAN
TODAY

A.

Japan’s Legal Protections for Procedural Justice Norms: Article 32
and Its Companions

If Japanese litigants wish to state claims for fairness in the litigation
process, their irreducible starting point is Article 32 of the Constitution, the
“right of access to the courts.” This provision represents Japan’s closest
counterpart to procedural due process in United States constitutional law.114
For our review, it is important to note at the outset that the standard
English language phrasing of Article 32, originating from the Allied
Occupation involvement in the constitutional drafting process, poorly
captures the Japanese language nuance. A more accurate translation of
saiban wo ukeru kenri might read “the right to obtain judicial hearings” or
even “the right to obtain justice in the courts” as the noun “saiban” connotes
both the event of a trial and judicial process overall and the verb “ukeru”
includes both the passive act of receiving or being given and the active act of
obtaining or getting.115
This article uses the standard translation, but readers are reminded that
the Constitution of Japan’s true meaning solely rests in how it is understood
by the people of Japan in their own language, the official language of the
document.

114
Professor Yasuhiro Okudaira surmises that the election not to use the term “due process of law”
was intentionally avoided by Allied Occupation (“SCAP”) officials in the constitutional drafting process.
This was because “a majority of SCAP legal officers were New Dealers, and it is reasonable to assume that
they hated the ‘substantive due process’ analysis that invalidated much early New Deal legislation.”
Yasuhiro Okudaira, The Constitution and Its Various Influences: Japanese, American, and European, in
JAPANESE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1, 13 (Percy R. Luney, Jr. & Kazuyuki Takahashi eds., Tokyo Univ. Press
1993). See also Kenzo Takayanagi, Opinions on Some Constitutional Problems—The Rule of Law, in
THE CONSTITUTION OF JAPAN: ITS FIRST TWENTY YEARS, 1947-67 89, 103 (Dan Fenno Henderson ed.,
Univ. of Wash. Press 1969) (similarly noting the SCAP authorities’ disapproval of substantive due process
as an influence in their work in Japan.).
115
KENKYUSHA'S NEW COLLEGE ENGLISH-JAPANESE DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1997). As to linguistic
discrepancies generally, see KYOKO INOUE, MACARTHUR’S JAPANESE CONSTITUTION: A LINGUISTIC AND
CULTURAL STUDY OF ITS MAKING 270 (Univ. of Chicago Press 1991) (“In retrospect, the acceptance of the
new Japanese Constitution by both the Americans and the Japanese depended heavily on the ambiguities of
cross linguistic and cross-cultural communication between both parties. . . . [This] made it possible for the
two sides to agree on a document without agreeing on its fundamental meaning.”).
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The Birth of Article 32 From the Realm of Criminal Justice

Article 32 has no counterpart in the Meiji Constitution that preceded
the present-day Constitution. In fact, the Meiji Constitution explicitly
denied Japanese citizens the right of access to judicial courts with regards
“to rights alleged to have been infringed by the illegal measures of the
administrative authorities.” 116 Such matters were given to a Court of
Administrative Litigation which operated solely under the authority of the
executive branch. 117 For ordinary civil matters, the Meiji Constitution
established a judiciary with the power to exercise judicial functions
“according to law, in the name of the Emperor”118 but the document had no
text suggesting that access to civil justice might be framed as a right to be
enjoyed by the citizenry.
Thus, when Japanese and Allied Occupation (“SCAP”)119 officials
began their pas-de-deux in drafting a post-war constitution for Japan, their
focus was on procedural protections for criminal charges 120 and the
strengthening of the judiciary more generally.121 Non-criminal procedural
rights of the citizenry in the courts were absent from Japan’s first significant
engagement with post-war constitutional revision, the so-called Matsumoto
draft scooped by the Mainichi newspaper on February 1, 1946,122 as well as
from the internal discussions among SCAP’s top-secret constitutional
drafting committee and from the confidential SCAP first draft presented to
116
MEIJI KENPŌ, art. 61. Citizens, or more precisely subjects (of the Emperor), were provided a
constrained “right” to “present petitions, by observing the proper forms of respect, and by complying with
the rules specially provided for the same.” Id. at art. 30. But any such petitions would be addressed to
legislative or administrative authorities and not under the consideration of the courts.
117
Id.
118
Id. at art. 57; see also Haley, supra note 18, at 115 (“This exclusive reservation of authority to act
in the emperor’s name exceeded even the military’s pre-war claim that the ‘supreme command’ of the
emperor precluded legislative or executive civilian control. It thereby insulated the courts from any direct
political intervention in the adjudication of cases by either legislative or administrative organs.”).
119
Hereinafter, SCAP using the commonly-used acronym of the formal title of the Occupation’s chief
authority, the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers.
120
See, e.g., Statement of the Japanese Government Concerning Required Reforms (“Five
Fundamental Reforms SCAP To Japanese Government”), October 11, 1945, available in THE
CONSTITUTION OF JAPAN: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF ITS FRAMING AND ADOPTION, 1945-47, RM041
(Ray A. Moore and Donald L. Robinson, eds., CD-ROM, 1998) [hereinafter, DOCUMENTARY HISTORY]
(“4. The abolition of systems which through secret inquisition and abuse have held the people in constant
fear, substituting therefore a system of justice designed to afford the people protection against despotic,
arbitrary and unjust methods.”).
121
See infra Part III.B.2.
122
The Tentative Plan of The Constitutional Problem Investigation Committee (also known as
“Matsumoto Draft” or “Mainichi scoop” version), Feb. 1, 1946, available in DOCUMENTARY HISTORY,
supra note 120, RM110. For the detailed story of Chairman Matsumoto, his Committee to Study
Constitutional Problems, and the “Mainichi scoop,” see KOSEKI SHŌICHI, THE BIRTH OF JAPAN’S POSTWAR CONSTITUTION 50-68 (Ray A. Moore trans., Westview Press 1997).
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the Japanese Cabinet less than two weeks later.123 The nascent emergence
of the phrasing, which would ultimately become Article 32, was a provision
authored by the Japanese drafters concerning criminal justice protections in
their first official draft given to SCAP, which read: “All of the people shall
not be denied the right to be tried by the judges as prescribed by law.”124
Two days later, for reasons that are unclear from the limited records
kept during a thirty-hour marathon negotiating session between SCAP and
Japanese officials, a more general “right of access to the courts” emerged in
the jointly developed draft language, though still set in a criminal justice
provision: “No person shall be deprived of life or liberty, nor shall any
criminal penalty be imposed, except according to procedure established by
the Diet, nor shall any person be denied the right of access to the courts.” 125
Again with reasons that are not presently clear but seemingly not related to
substantive purposes, that clause was detached to stand as a separate
provision by the Japanese drafters in the June 20, 1946 draft constitution
submitted by the Japanese Government to the House of Representatives.126
And so the language of Article 32 was born—connected at the hip
with criminal due process. Professor Yasuhiro Okudaira’s observation that
the Japanese drafters of the Constitution were “utterly unfamiliar with the
concept of procedural due process” in light of the significant influence of
German law that was prevalent at the time, seems especially important.127
It may be fair to say that the drafters did not even consider the possibility of
123
Civil rights, first discussion of draft, Meeting of the Steering Committee with Committee on Civil
Rights Feb. 8, 1946; Civil Rights: first draft SCAP: GS, undated [presumably Feb. 8, 1946]; Civil rights,
second discussion of draft, Meeting of the Steering Committee with Committee on Civil Rights, Feb. 9,
1946; Civil Rights, final draft,. Feb. 10, 1946; Steering Committee Review of Amended Drafts, Feb. 12,
1946; U.S. model constitution as submitted to Japanese Cabinet, Feb. 13, 1946, available in
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 120, RM 172-75, RM 187, RM189. As to the nine days of secret
drafting, see generally KOSEKI supra note 122, at 68-111. For SCAP participant memoirs, see Charles L.
Kades, The American Role in Revising Japan’s Imperial Constitution, 104 POL. SCI. Q. 215 (1989); BEATE
SIROTA GORDON, THE ONLY WOMAN IN THE ROOM (Kodansha 1997); Cyrus H. Peake, Reflections on the
Occupation of Japan and the Drafting of the New Constitution, in STUDIA ASIATICA: ESSAYS IN ASIAN
STUDIES IN FELICITATION OF THE SEVENTY-FIFTH ANNIVERSARY OF PROFESSOR CH’EN SHOU-YI 413
(Laurence G. Thompson ed., Chinese Materials Ctr. 1975); HARRY EMERSON WILDES, TYPHOON IN TOKYO
(MacMillan 1954).
124
First Japanese Government draft Mar. 4, 1946, art. 27, available in DOCUMENTARY HISTORY,
supra note 120, RM208 (“This is the draft which the representatives of the cabinet, including Matsumoto
Jōji and Satō Tatsuo, brought to the meeting [with SCAP officials] of March 4-5, 1946.”).
125
Second Japanese Government draft Mar. 6, 1946, art. 30, available in DOCUMENTARY HISTORY,
supra note 120, RM208 (“This is the draft that emerged from the “translating marathon” of March 4-5,
1946.”) (emphasis added). On the marathon session, see generally KOSEKI, supra note 122, at 117-22.
126
Draft revision submitted to House of Representatives June 20, 1946, art. 29, available in
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 120, RM312. See generally KOSEKI, supra note 122, at 165-92
(“The Draft Constitution in the Last Imperial Diet”).
127
Okudaira, supra note 114, at 14.

MARCH 2011

LIMITS ON INSTRUMENTAL JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION IN JAPAN

293

the language taking on the role that it has in civil and administrative law
litigation. If so, then the civil procedural justice doctrine now active in
Japanese constitutional law came from nothing more than an unintended
consequence of a hasty editing process.
2.

The Post-war Progression to Understanding Article 32 as a Civil
Procedural Right

Although born out of criminal procedural protections (and perhaps
apart from the intentions of its drafters), Article 32 has gradually taken on
constitutional law understandings as providing procedural rights in civil and
administrative litigation. Interestingly, the first actors to move this forward
were not scholars, but the courts, though again perhaps unintentionally.128
Scholars followed rather slowly, so that the wide-spread recognition of such
a perspective may not have been fully entrenched until as recently as 1980.
Professor Yasuhei Taniguchi lays out this doctrinal development with
some degree of detail in a leading law journal’s special edition on Civil
Procedure Law:
Constitutional interest in the law of civil procedure in Japan is
relatively new. Because the pre-war Constitution did not even
give the courts constitutional review powers, that Constitution
was really nothing more than a written political declaration.
Therefore, even if the appropriateness of procedural law
standards were reviewed from the perspective of general reason
(jyōri / 条理), there was no possibility of seeing it the context
of concrete constitutional provisions. Accordingly, as that
manner of traditional pre-war civil procedure law
conceptualizations underlies constitutional law considerations
of the post-war Constitution, [at first], there was almost no
interest in how [civil procedural] protections arise
constitutionally.
Professor Katsumi Yamakaido’s “procedural rights”
principles put forth in 1959 was extremely forward-thinking,
but it did not consider constitutional protections per se. And
in an article I wrote in 1966 looking at the issue of multi-party
litigation in the United States, I wrote as background for my
128
Some of the Supreme Court decisions which apparently alerted Japanese law scholars to begin
thinking about civil procedural justice in constitutional principles were decided on strictly statutory grounds.
Id. at 15.
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United States law scholarly investigation that the notion of due
process in our country’s civil procedural law scholarship was
still sleeping and deserved to have some light put on it in the
future.
It was instead case law that took up the initiative for
discussing constitutional protections in judicial procedures.
After a line of cases emerged from the Supreme Court finding
unconstitutionality in third-party confiscation . . . and the
constitutionality of non-contentious matters procedures
(hishōjiken tetsuzuki / 非訟事件手続 )129 around 1960, these
decisions drew deeper interest among civil procedure law
scholars which included an increased interest in constitutional
law linkages.
As well, we cannot ignore the influence that arose out of
constitutional law discussions in German civil procedure
scholarship pertaining to the right to demand legal hearings
provided for in the post-war Bonn Fundamental Law (Anspruch
auf rechtliches Gehor).
In any case, the 1966 case of the non-contentiousness of
leasehold disputes served as a touchstone for the academic
world.
Ultimately, Professor Hideo Saito advocated a
Constitutional Procedural Rights Theory in 1969, and we can
say that by the time the Civil Procedure Law Scholars
Association held a symposium in 1980 on “Procedural
Protections and the Function of Litigation,” scholarly interest in
the subject was fully formed.130

129

Translation note: Matters such as judicial conciliation procedures in landlord and tenant disputes
and marital dissolutions, which lack formal binding authority on the parties. They are governed by their
own statutory framework apart from the Code of Civil Procedure. Hishō Jiken Tetsuzukihō [NonContentious Litigation Procedure Law], Law No. 14 of 1956. Accordingly, constitutional questions arose
with regards to whether procedural protections ordinarily allowed for judicial matters are guaranteed in
such cases. With separate constitutional footings, the distinction between what procedures are contentious
and non-contentious remains a subject of debate. See, e.g., Hiroshige Takada, Soshō to Hishō
[Contentious and Non-Contentious Litigation], in MINJI SOSHŌ HŌ NO SŌTEN DAI 4 BAN [ISSUES IN CIVIL
PROCEDURE LAW, VOL. 4] 12-15 (Jurist Special Ed. 2009).
130
Yasuhei Taniguchi, Minji Soshō ni Okeru Kempōteki Hoshō [Constitutional Guarantees in Civil
Procedure] in MINJI SOSHŌ HŌ NO SŌTEN DAI 3 BAN [ISSUES IN CIVIL PROCEDURE LAW, VOL. 3] 8-9 (Jurist
Special ed. 1998) (citations omitted; additional paragraph breaks inserted for readability in translation).
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The Role of Article 32 as a Civil Procedural Right Today

Article 32 now commands a consensus understanding that it includes
“the right of every person to bring suit in the courts with regards to civil and
administrative matters.”131 Moreover, this right is understood to go beyond
the mere notion of having unlocked courthouse doors; it plainly incorporates
notions of fairness in the process.
Citing several of Japan’s foremost post-war constitutional law
scholars, Professor Eiji Sasada recently presented this as follows:
[A]lbeit a rather recent arrival132 is the insistence that courts be
“impartial” (kōsei / 公正) . Professor Ashibe wrote “for ‘the
courts,’ there must be a guarantee of appropriate procedures
that are fitting to whatever kind of matter is involved.” As
well, as to the right of access to the courts, Professor Urabe
insisted “it does not stop with the notion simply that one can
demand a trial. In order for there to be a fair trial, there must
be bundled together in that a call for regular procedures and
operations of the courts.” Professor Takeshita offers a more
structural explanation for his opinion. He writes “Article 32
demands the construction of a judicial system that is adequate
to guarantee the right of access to the courts in actual reality.
That means that they must maintain a judicial system which in
fact can do that and imposes on the state an obligation that the
judicial system will provide judicial relief to the people.”
Moreover, as to the obligation on the state for its exercise of
judicial power, he proposes three distinct elements, “providing
the organization and related operations of the courts,”
“establishment of trial procedures,” and “the conferral of
judicial authority.”133
Specifically as to fairness, Professor Aritoshi Fukunaga identifies a
specific “Right to Demand Fair Procedures” (kōsei na tetsuzuki wo
motomeru kenri / 公正な手続きを求める権利) as being among the
conceptual components underlying constitutional civil procedure protections

131
SASADA, supra note 78, at 86, (quoting TOSHIHIKO NAKANO ET AL, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I 489
(Yuhikaku 1997)).
132
Translation note: Another indicator of the relative newness of fairness in the conceptualization
of civil procedure in Japan is the fact that the notion did not appear in the Code of Civil Procedure until
1996. See text and sources cited infra notes 161-162.
133
Id. (citations omitted).
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in Japan, but he also notes its relative lack of development.134 Drawing
upon earlier work of Professor Teiichirō Nakano in connection with
international human rights instruments, he writes:
In our country, one can not yet say that there has been sufficient
debate concerning this right but according to Professor
Nakano’s studies “the right to a trial” reflects fundamental
principles of equality under the law and further includes the
“right to receive a fair and open trial” set out in the ICCPR.
Therefore, this right is one variant of the general provisions
that, like the obligation of good faith, etc., are “norms which
must always be made real.”135
On the other hand, while scholars have proclaimed the existence of
these constitutional rights in theory,136 the courts have been less generous.
Professor Fukunaga informs readers that Japan’s Supreme Court has limited
its application of Article 32 by providing substantial deference to the
legislature in the determination of civil procedure laws for the courts.
[I]t has been interpreted [by the Supreme Court] that there are
no violations of Article 32 with regards to various rules
pertaining to jurisdiction, statutes of limitations, or appellate
procedures, etc. Of course, the types of courts, their limits of
authority, structure, appeals, etc., set by the provisions in the
Court Act and the Code of Civil Procedure, are also not
constitutionally guaranteed.137
Accordingly, setting aside “what should be,” some Japanese scholars’
assessment of Article 32’s protections in actual practice are rather critical.
For example, Professor Taniguchi contrasts the variety of approaches taken
by lower courts and Supreme Court in a leading 1989 Supreme Court
decision relating to the right to notice enjoyed by a deceased biological
134
Aritoshi Fukunaga, Minji Soshō ni Okeru Kempō Hoshō [Constitutional Guarantees Concerning
Civil Litigation] in MINJI SOSHŌ HŌ NO SŌTEN DAI 4 BAN [ISSUES IN CIVIL PROCEDURE LAW, VOL. 4] 8
(Jurist Special ed. 2009).
135
Id. at 11 (quoting Teiichirō Nakano, Minji Soshō to Kempō [Civil Procedure and the Constitution]
in KŌZA MINJI SOSHŌ (1) [LECTURES ON CIVIL PROCEDURE LAW (1)] 9 (Koji Shindō et al. eds., Kōbundō
1984).
136
E.g., Professor Fukunaga’s five-part framework for Fundamental Procedural Rights (drawing on
Art. 32 as well as other constitutional provisions): 1) the right to demand a hearing, 2) the right to
procedural equality, 3) the right to timely litigation process, 4) the right to demand open adversary
proceedings and judgments, and 5) the right to demand fair procedures. Id.
137
Id. at 8. Professor Fukunaga expresses support for this deference to the legislature, noting that a
freestanding constitutional right should only be articulated in exceptional cases, where for some reason,
fairness already built into the Code Of Civil Procedure fails to function. Id. at 11.
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father’s heirs in paternity litigation.138 Although his phrasing is understated,
the conclusion clearly criticizes the Supreme Court’s approach:
If we look at the decisions as handed down by each of the
courts beginning from its first consideration at the trial court,
we can become acquainted with a variety of approaches to the
relationship between civil procedure and constitutional
protections. The first decision, by the Fukuoka District Court,
found that the binding power of paternity judgments binds third
parties and accordingly, there should be procedural protections
in paternity litigation arising under Constitution Articles 31 and
32 for those parties who would be affected by the determination.
However, the court found no constitutional issue owing to the
fact that the interests of third parties related to the matter are
procedurally protected in the Personal Affairs Litigation
Procedures Law,139 as it draws upon official power systems
through public prosecutors as representatives of the public
interest. Finally, [the court found that] the plaintiff’s claims
for a “right to demand a trial” are not explicit in [Japan’]
constitutional text, and this was so even if there was no notice
received or opportunity provided to intervene in the relevant
litigation.
The second decision by the Fukuoka High Court held that
“in light of the spirit of the Article 32 of the Constitution,” “it
was unreasonable to fix a paternity judgment while the heirs
had no knowledge [of the case], in consideration of the effect
upon their persons and of taking their assets. Moreover, we
can not anticipate sufficient engagement by the prosecutors in
the litigation and so it becomes difficult for the gathering of
sufficient evidence to carry out the official power of the
courts.” And so the [High] Court granted the request for
retrial….140
138
Professor Taniguchi explains the underlying facts as follows: “When paternity was recognized
by litigation in an individual after his death, his heirs had a substantial interest relationship in the results of
the case because recognition of paternity would result in their losing a portion of their inheritance.
However, they were not parties to the [paternity] litigation.” Taniguchi, supra note 130, at 9.
139
Translation note: This is the law in Japan under which paternity actions are pursued. Jinji
Soshō Tetsuzukihō [Personal Affairs Litigation Law], Law No. 109 of 2003.
140
Translation note: The text continues, “… recognizing the heirs’ qualification as plaintiffs in the
retrial by applying Article 34 of the Administrative Case Litigation Law as being in line with the intent of
the Constitution Articles 31 and 32 and drawing upon by analogy Article 420 (now, 338) (1)(3) of the Code
Of Civil Procedure.”
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The Supreme Court, while holding that ‘obviously, an
opportunity to participate would be desirable,’ overruled the
reasoning described above, annulled the District Court decision
that had rejected the claims, and then applied its own rationale
to dismiss the case.
It is not my purpose here to go into a critique of this case
per se, but comparing each of the decisions in the case
illustrates various ways of thinking about constitutional
protections in civil procedure. First, in the instant case, there
was no issue as to whether the rights interests at stake for the
heirs, as to their persons and as to their property deriving from
their inheritance rights, ought to be protected. The issue was
then the manner and degree to which those interests would be
protected.
The District Court decision found that the involvement of
the public prosecutor in the exercise of official power was
sufficient. The High Court decision instead found the exercise
of official power to be insufficient as an opportunity [for the
heirs] to participate in the trial which determined whether or
not paternity would be recognized needed to be provided. And
as the Supreme Court even stated that it was desirable to
provide the heirs an opportunity to participate along with the
public prosecutor if the paternity litigation was still pending, it
was not that they refused to recognize the interests at stake.
However, given that the paternity judgment was already
finalized, refusing to recognize their qualification as plaintiffs
in the retrial was functionally equivalent to totally ignoring that
interest. It was not expressly stated, but in finalizing the
paternity judgment [the Court] prioritized its own stability
[over the heirs’ interests in the litigation].
This shows that the protection of [procedural] rights is a
relative matter in accordance with the circumstances.141
Professor Sasada has shared his views more bluntly, but also
recognized room for optimism that might come out of judicial reform
processes:

141

Taniguchi, supra note 130, at 9-10 (citations omitted, emphasis added).
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[L]ooking broadly over Supreme Court case decisions in our
country, we have an impoverished reality in the procedural
protection of human rights beginning with the right of access to
the courts. Leaving aside those judges who advocate for
fairness in civil litigation, a results-based way of thinking is
understood to be predominant just as much as ever. However,
strengthening the consciousness of judges as to procedural
protections under the Constitution is undeniably a possibility
arising from judicial reform.142
4.

Article 32 in Context: Its Constitutional, Treaty, and Statutory
“Cousins” in the Protection of Civil Procedural Fairness

Article 32 represents the center of a larger web of legal provisions that
pertain to procedural fairness and systems of judicial administration in
Japanese law. These will be introduced next, though it may be helpful to
note at the start that their roles are significantly more aspirational in terms of
how people talk about civil procedural fairness and less meaningful in terms
of concrete actualities that they presently realize.
a.

Constitutional provisions

In the Constitution, Article 32’s most numerous and closest relations
are the fundamental human rights provisions pertaining to criminal
procedures.143 In contrast, Article 32’s companions for civil procedural
justice includes only two provisions, Article 14’s equality under the law144
and Article 82’s right to public trials.145 Article 76’s command that judges
“be independent in the exercise of their conscience and… bound only by this
Constitution and the laws”146 is notably absent here. That is because no

142

SASADA, supra note 56, at 47 (citations omitted, emphasis added).
See, e.g., KENPŌ, arts. 31, 33-40; see generally text and sources cited supra notes 120-127.
144
KENPŌ, art. 14 (“All of the people are equal under the law and there shall be no discrimination in
political, economic or social relations because of race, creed, sex, social status or family origin. Peers and
peerage shall not be recognized. No privilege shall accompany any award of honor, decoration or any
distinction, nor shall any such award be valid beyond the lifetime of the individual who now holds or
hereafter may receive it.”).
145
KENPŌ, art. 82 (“Trials shall be conducted and judgment declared publicly. Where a court
unanimously determines publicity to be dangerous to public order or morals, a trial may be conducted
privately, but trials of political offenses, offenses involving the press or cases wherein the rights of people
as guaranteed in Chapter III of this Constitution are in question shall always be conducted publicly.”).
146
KENPŌ, art. 76, para. 3 (“All judges shall be independent in the exercise of their conscience and
shall be bound only by this Constitution and the laws.”).
143
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one presently interprets it as providing a basis for an enforceable civil right
that can be claimed by ordinary citizens.147
In his recent work, Professor Fukunaga articulates a “Right to
Procedural Equality” (tetsuzuki jyō no byōdō ken / 手続上の平等権) as
follows:
The Constitution’s Article 14 (1) provision for equality under
the law does not only apply to substantive law, but to
procedural law as well. The principle of equality in [litigation
process] armaments has constitutional protection embodied in
the principle of equality. This requires that parties who
oppose either the legislature or executive agencies face equal
circumstances and receive equal treatment.
Thus it is
necessary to [textually] examine each and every provision of
procedural law to determine whether it is in conformity with the
principal of equality. Consideration of the principal of
equality is necessary as to the interpretation and application of
each of these provisions as well.148
Plainly, this theoretical rights claim is implicated in administrative
cases where ordinary citizen’s suits are unevenly balanced in the
government’s favor.
However, notwithstanding Professor Shigenori
Matsui’s contention that the Administrative Case Litigation Law may be
unconstitutionally imbalanced on its face,149 I found no writings describing
an actual application of Article 14’s equality provision into civil procedural
case law jurisprudence.150
As to Article 82, Professor Fukunaga postulates a “Right to Demand
Open Adversary Proceedings and Judgment” (Taishin, Hanketsu no Kōkai
wo Motomeru Kenri / 対審・判決の公開を求める権利). However, he
notes its relatively weaker significance in civil trials and suggests that the
public’s interest in this right should be subordinate to parties’ interests in
litigation:
At the outset, openness per se is not the purpose for the
principle. Rather, it is a means that aims to preserve the trust
147
Sasada interview, supra note 22. Professor Matsui also finds an indirect relation in Article 13’s
right to “the pursuit of happiness” in light of the fact that procedural protections are necessary to preserve
the right. MATSUI, supra note 12, at 93-97 (citing KENPŌ, art. 13).
148
Fukunaga, supra note 134, at 10 (emphasis added).
149
Professor Matsui presents this as an issue arising under Article 32, not Article 14. MATSUI,
supra note 12, at 177, quoted in SASADA, supra note 78, at 91.
150
Professor Sasada also shared with me his belief that Article 14 provides a relatively weaker
footing for civil procedural justice claims in comparison with Article 32. Sasada interview, supra note 22.
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of the people in the courts by allowing them to measure the
fairness of trials through the ability of being able to observe
trials. This function of observation is particularly important
for criminal proceedings (and for that purpose the general
provision of Article 82 is supplemented by Article 37 (1)),
while its meaning in civil procedure is comparatively less.
[Thus,] if sticking to the principle of open trials would infringe
upon [litigants’ Article 32] right of access to the courts, then the
very essence of that right is undone.
b.

Treaties—International Declaration of Human Rights and the ICCPR

As noted above, civil procedural justice is contained within Japan’s
treaty obligations under both the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(“UDHR”) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(“ICCPR”). 151 In theory at least, these provisions should have direct
applicability in the law available to parties in Japan in their articulation of
their rights before the Japanese courts.152
The UDHR addresses civil procedural justice at Article 10:
“Everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an
independent and impartial tribunal, in the determination of his rights and
obligations and of any criminal charge against him.”153 Meanwhile, two
provisions of the ICCPR pertain, Article 14 quite particularly (“All persons
shall be equal before the courts and tribunals”) and Article 26 more
generally (“All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any
discrimination to the equal protection of the law.”).154
Japanese courts have drawn from these documents to impose binding
obligations on the executive branch in other contexts.155 Nonetheless, for
the time being, these provisions seem to have only hortatory weight in the
151
UDHR, supra note 9; ICCPR, supra note 10. Japan became a signatory to the ICCPR treaty in
1979. Shiminteki Oyobi Seijiteki Kenri ni Kan Suru Kokusai Kiyaku [International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights], Treaty No. 7 of 1979.
152
See generally YUJI IWASAWA, INTERNATIONAL LAW, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND JAPANESE LAW
(Oxford Univ. Press 1998); Kenneth L. Port, The Japanese International Law “Revolution”: International
Human Rights Law and Its Impact in Japan, 28 STAN. J. INT’L. L. 139 (1991).
153
UDHR, supra note 9 (emphasis added).
154
ICCPR, supra note 10. Professor Fukunaga’s writing highlights ICCPR Article 14 as being a
part of Japan’s constitutional guarantees of fairness and impartiality of judges and the courts. Fukunaga,
supra note 134, at 8.
155
For example, the court’s analysis in the Nibutani Dam decision finding illegality in the
government’s construction of the dam was grounded legally in Article 13 of the Constitution and Article 14
of the ICCPR. Mark Levin, Kayano et al. v. Hokkaido Expropriation Committee: ‘The Nibutani Dam
Decision,’ 38 INT’L. LEGAL MATERIALS 394 (1999), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1635447 (last
visited Jan. 1, 2011); see generally Levin, supra note 112.

302

PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL

VOL. 20 NO. 2

context of civil procedural justice.156 It remains to be seen whether a court
would draw upon these in an actual case holding. Even if not there, one
hopes nonetheless that judicial administrators would take the provisions to
heart in their work and in developing future policies for judicial
administration in Japan.
c.

Statutes—civil procedural justice in Japan’s Code of Civil Procedure

In principle, the entirety of Japan’s Code of Civil Procedure157 aims
to effectuate civil procedural justice in the nation’s courts. However, while
all of its provisions may be equal in this pursuit, some “are more equal than
others.”158
We begin at the beginning. After the opening statement and
effectuation of the Code’s purpose in Article 1,159 the next order of business
in Article 2 is fairness, together with expeditious proceedings and an
obligation of good faith upon litigation parties: “Courts shall endeavor to
ensure that civil suits are carried out fairly and expeditiously, and parties
shall conduct civil suits in good faith.”160
This provision is a very recent addition to Japanese civil procedure
law. The Code’s principal incarnations have been its enactment in 1890,
post-war amendments in 1948, and a complete revision in 1996,161 which
essentially represents today’s version.162 However, Article 2’s language
asking courts to endeavor to carry out civil suits with fairness only first
appeared in the 1996 revision.
Moreover, there is less here than might meet the eye. The language
of the Code provision displays the malleable status of fairness in the minds
of legislative drafters.163 It is important to observe the dichotomy between
156

Sasada interview, supra note 22.
MINJI SOSHOHŌ [MINSOHŌ] [C. CIV. PRO.].
158
GEORGE
ORWELL,
ANIMAL
FARM
(1945)
(Penguin,
1996),
available
at
http://www.gutenberg.net.au/ebooks01/0100011h.html (last visited Jan. 1, 2011).
159
MINJI SOSHOHŌ [MINSOHŌ] [C. CIV. PRO.] art. 1 (“Procedures for civil suits shall be governed by
the provisions of this Code, in addition to the provisions of other laws and regulations.”).
160
Id. at art. 2 (emphasis added).
161
Id.; Law No. 29 of 1890; Law No. 149 of 1948; Law No. 109 of 1996.
162
There were minor amendments in 1999, 2001, and annually between 2003 and 2007.
163
Professor Taniguchi similarly criticizes legislators’ lack of understanding of fairness in their
enactment of revisions to the Personal Status Litigation Procedures Law. “Even in the recent amendment
of the Personal Affairs Litigation Procedure Law, one sees no understanding, not even pro forma, that this
should be motivated by the purpose of protecting the constitutional appropriateness of procedures.
Ultimately, the issue was only perceived of as being at the level of the propriety of legislative policy.”
Taniguchi, supra note 130, at 10 (citation omitted). At the same time, the Supreme Court’s General
Secretariat staff must have been integrally involved in the drafting process for both statutes. Accordingly,
they would have had the wherewithal to dissent influentially if they wished for stronger procedural
protections in the laws.
157
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the binding nature of the obligation of good faith imposed on litigation
parties and the weaker and bifurcated aspiration expressed to Japan’s judges.
On careful review of the Japanese language phrasing, this is not subtle.
Courts are only directed to make best efforts (endeavor / okonawareru yō ni
tsutome / 行われるように努め)164 to ensure fairness, while the phrasing
as to parties, (tsuikō shinakereba naranai / 追行しなければならない) is
an unambiguous command. As well, the guidance to the courts is
moderated by an equally weighted instruction to ensure expeditiousness,
with no advice as to how to address circumstances where the two goals may
conflict.165 Not surprisingly, given both its newness and its impotency,
there appears to be no published case law that addresses Article 2.
Thus, the best hope for fairness in the Code must then be in its more
concrete provisions and how they are applied by the courts. For example,
independent provisions provide for disqualification of judges (joseki / 除
斥) 166 and for direct party challenges (kihi / 忌避) to judges. 167 Both
require a party to expressly petition for the action,168 although a judge’s sua
sponte recusal is allowed under the Rules Of Civil Procedure providing that
the judge first “obtain[s] the permission of the court that has the power of

164

The direction to “endeavor” or make best efforts (tsutome / 努め) is not uncommon in Japanese
legislation “where a gentle touch is desired.” Levin, supra note 87, at 110 n.35 (introducing examples in
Japan’s Equal Employment Opportunities Law and Administrative Procedure Law).
165
As to the risk that expeditiousness may detrimentally impact other fundamental values in civil
procedure, see supra note 17.
166
MINJI SOSHOHŌ [MINSOHŌ] [C. CIV. PRO.] art. 23 (“In the following cases, a judge shall be
disqualified from performing his/her duties; provided, however, that in the case set forth in item (vi), this
shall not preclude a judge from performing his/her duties as a commissioned judge based on the
commission from another court:
(i) Where a judge or his/her spouse or person who was his/her spouse is a party to the case,
or is related to a party in the case as a joint obligee, joint obligor or obligor for redemption.
(ii) Where a judge is or was a party's relative by blood within the fourth degree, relative
through marriage within the third degree or relative living together.
(iii) Where a judge is, in relation to a party, a guardian, supervisor of a guardian, curator,
supervisor of a curator, assistant or a supervisor of an assistant.
(iv) Where a judge has served as a witness or expert witness in the case.
(v) Where a judge is or was a party's agent or assistant in court in the case.
(vi) Where a judge has participated in making an arbitral award in the case or participated
in making a judicial decision in the prior instance against which an appeal is entered.”)
167
Id. at art. 24 (“If there are circumstances with regard to a judge that would prejudice the
impartiality of a judicial decision, a party may challenge such judge. . . . (2) A party, if he/she, in the
presence of a judge, has presented oral arguments or made statements in preparatory proceedings, may not
challenge the judge; provided, however, that this shall not apply where the party did not know of the
existence of any grounds for challenge or where any grounds for challenge occurred thereafter.”).
168
Id. at art. 23, para. 2 (“If any of the grounds for disqualification prescribed in the preceding
paragraph exist, the court, upon petition or by its own authority, shall make a judicial decision of
disqualification.”).
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supervision.” 169
These provisions directly implicate fairness and
impartiality of judges in civil proceedings, but none apparently carry much
weight in actual practice.
One early Supreme Court decision concerning these sections of
the Code may prompt some surprise in that Court’s understanding of
these provisions and the underlying principles at stake at the time. In
the case, X v. Y Forestry Partnership,170 after judgment in the High
Court appeal had been entered, the losing side’s legal counsel learned
that the presiding judge in the High Court proceedings had been his
opposing counsel’s son-in-law. 171 Accordingly, the losing side
raised this as grounds for mandatory appeal172 raising inter alia a
claim under Article 24 (then Article 37) that the father-in-law / son-inlaw relationship between his opposing counsel and the presiding judge
qualified as “circumstances…that would prejudice the impartiality of
a judicial decision” and therefore asking that the High Court decision
be set aside.173
The Supreme Court disagreed. In a unanimous decision by its
Second Petty Bench, the Court first noted that the presiding judge’s
participation in the case was not barred by the Code’s disqualification
provision (presumably because as the statute only addresses a judge’s
relationship to a party, not to their attorneys). Accordingly, the question
turned on whether the circumstances would prejudice the judge’s
impartiality. In a manner that would appease former First Lady Nancy
Reagan, the justices just said no—foregoing any discussion of principles of
fairness or the possibility of prejudice in the underlying decision, and
evidencing no sense of obligation to explain themselves.174
169
“A judge may withdraw. . . ” Minji Soshō Kisoku [Rules Of Civil Procedure] Sup. Ct. Rule No.
10 of 2008, art. 12 (Japan) (emphasis added).
170
X v. Y Forestry Partnership, 9 MINSHŪ 83 (Sup. Ct. 2nd Petty Bench, Jan. 28, 1955) (note that X
and Y are translated counterparts of Japan’s John Doe and Jane Roe; the standard Japanese citation is to the
published case reporter without including party names).
171
The son-in-law judge’s vote in the decision supported the prevailing party, his father-in-law’s
client. Kiichi Nishino, Kihi Jiyū [Grounds for Judicial Challenge] in MINJI SOSHŌHŌ HANREI HAKUSEN
DAI 3 BAN [100 LEADING CASES IN CIVIL PROCEDURE LAW, VOL. 3] 169 (BESSATSU JURIST [SPECIAL
EDITION] 20 (Yuhikakū 2003)).
172
Claims that a judge heard a matter when prohibited by law constitute grounds which must be taken
up by a court of final appeal (ordinarily the Supreme Court). MINSOHŌ [C. CIV. PRO.] art. 312, para. 2,
sec. ii (“A [mandatory] final appeal may also be filed by reason of . . . (ii) A judge who may not participate
in making the judgment under any Acts participated in making the judgment.”).
173
Id.
174
The Court’s ruling on this issue was expressed in a single declaratory sentence of judicial fiat:
“Appellant's argument on point number five is without reason because the fact that the judge who was the
presiding judge in the trial court was the son-in-law of the lawyer for the appellee partnership is not among
the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure Article 35 and furthermore, we cannot say that the circumstances
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Perhaps not surprisingly, the decision has never earned even a single
defender in academic commentary. 175 Fortunately, scholars today also
believe that it remains on the books as a leading precedent primarily because
no matter has risen up that would give the Supreme Court the chance to
reverse itself. “Were this today, it is expected that first, a judge in the same
circumstances as Judge A in this case would certainly recuse himself, and
were an issue such as this to come before the Supreme Court, the likelihood
that the Supreme Court would uphold this decision seems rather small.”176
Since that decision, there are published reports of only seven Supreme
Court cases and six High Court cases pertaining to these provisions. In all
of these, only one, an appellate decision by the Takamatsu High Court in
2002, reversed a lower court decision owing to a judge’s failure to step
down when disqualified or a refusal to step down on challenge. 177
Moreover, others still seem to reflect a narrow attitude in the courts with
regards to judicial challenge, albeit nothing as remarkable as the Y Forestry
Partnership case. 178 An optimist would hope that this reflects entirely
accurate decision-making by Japan’s judges to step down in appropriate
circumstances. However, in light of the apparent futility of seeking to
enforce these provisions absent something so egregious as a close family
relationship between the judge and a lawyer, as well as the risk of
antagonizing the judge one is appearing in front of by making such a petition,
it appears that these provisions still have rather limited meaning.179
The Code also expressly addresses the circumstances, which arise
when a judge is transferred away from the case in the course of an ongoing
trial. The Code provision is self-explanatory:

clearly implicate the terms of Article 37 by [there being] a judge that would impair the fairness of the trial.”
X v. Y Forestry Partnership, supra note 170, point II.
175
Nishino, supra note 171, at 21.
176
Id. Professors Sasada and Takami also expressed this view. Sasada interview, supra note 22;
Interview with Professor Susumu Takami, Professor of Civil Procedure Law, Hokkaido University School
of Law, Sapporo, Japan (July 18, 2009) [hereinafter Takami interview].
177
Judge A decided the results in Trial A. The losing plaintiff then challenged that result in a
subsequent suit for damages, naming Judge A as a defendant (Trial B). Being plainly covered by the
Code’s Article 24 (i), Judge A’s presiding over Trial B was set aside. X v. Y, 2002 WLJPCA03070005
(Westlaw Japan) (Takamatsu High Ct., Mar. 7, 2002).
178
In the most recent Supreme Court decision in this area, the Court upheld a lower court’s denial of
challenge where a judge who had participated in the establishment of certain court rules at a Judicial
Assembly was being called upon in the litigation to determine the validity of the same. X v. Y., 45
MINSHŪ 117 (Sup. Ct. 1st Petty Bench, Feb. 25, 1992).
179
Professor Nishino asserts that the system “regrettably, does not function at all,” describing both an
“abuse of petitions” by litigants and an “abuse of denials” on the part of judges when challenges are raised.
Nishino, supra note 171, at 21. Similar views were expressed to me in several interviews. As to the
state of affairs in the United States today, see Caperton, supra note 4.
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A judgment shall be made by a judge who has participated in
the oral argument on which the judgment is to be based.
(2) In the case of the replacement of a judge, the parties
shall state the result of the oral argument already conducted.
(3) In the case of the replacement of a single judge or
the replacement of the majority of a panel of judges, if a party
has requested the additional examination of a witness who has
already been examined before the replacement, the court shall
examine the witness.180
Here again, informants in Japan report that the stronger measures in
paragraph three are rarely invoked181 and I was able to find no case law
pertaining to this provision. What is interesting, however, is the history of
paragraph three. Where paragraphs one and two derive from the first
enactment of the Code of Civil Procedure in 1890, 182 paragraph three
emerged in the 1948 amendments,183 apparently following guidance from
Allied Occupation authorities seeking to impose their common law
sensibilities with regards to the need for judges to hear witnesses’ live
testimony.184 Brought in as a transplant, Article 249(3) has not taken root.
This more extended review of the history and development of Article
32 and related provisions in Japanese law informs us of their potential role in
stating “what should be” with regards to instrumental judicial administration
in Japan. If Professor Fukunaga is correct that a proper understanding of
Japan’s constitutional protections should incorporate a “Right to Demand
Fair Procedures” in civil litigation, then it cannot be enough to simply rely
upon ostensibly neutral statutory structures such as those in the Code of
Civil Procedure.185 As with United States employment discrimination laws,
clear evidence of disparate impacts should at least give rise to meaningful
concern on the part of legislators, if not also serving as a basis for remedies
in the courts.
These ideas are raised again in Part IV of this article. But first, it is
also essential to understand more concretely the setting for the systems of
judicial administration first described in Part II above.
180

MINJI SOSHOHŌ [MINSOHŌ] [C. CIV. PRO.] art. 249.
Takami interview, supra note 176; Katayama interview, supra note 86.
182
The only change being in numbering and the modernization of archaic phrasing and characters.
183
Compare MINJI SOSHOHŌ [MINSOHŌ] [C. CIV. PRO.] with Law No. 29 of 1890 (art. 187), and Law
No. 149 of 1948 (art. 187), and Law No. 109 of 1996 (art. 249).
184
Takami interview, supra note 176.
185
See, e.g., Yamamoto, supra note 17, at 396-98 (“Challenging Assumptions of Neutrality”).
181
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The Legal Framework of Judicial Administration in Japan

As much of the legal framework for judicial administration in Japan
has been introduced in previous parts of this paper, a brief overview should
be sufficient in order to put the system into a coherent view. More
importantly, however, is the historical background which plays itself
forward into the present circumstances.
1.

Constitutional Provisions and the Court Act

Constitutional provisions concerning the courts are assembled into a
single chapter, Chapter VI. Sections relevant for the discussion here are:
1) Article 76:
The whole judicial power is vested in a Supreme Court
and in such inferior courts as are established by law.
2) No extraordinary tribunal shall be established, nor
shall any organ or agency of the Executive be given final
judicial power.
3) All judges shall be independent in the exercise of their
conscience and shall be bound only by this Constitution
and the laws.
2) Article 77:
The Supreme Court is vested with the rule-making power
under which it determines the rules of procedure and of
practice, and of matters relating to attorneys, the internal
discipline of the courts and the administration of judicial
affairs
...
3) The Supreme Court may delegate the power to make
rules for inferior courts to such courts.
3) Article 78:
Judges shall not be removed except by public
impeachment unless judicially declared mentally or
physically incompetent to perform official duties. No
disciplinary action against judges shall be administered
by any executive organ or agency.
4) Article 79:
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The Supreme Court shall consist of a Chief Judge and
such number of judges as may be determined by law:
all such judges excepting the Chief Judge shall be
appointed by the Cabinet . . . .
5) Article 80:
The judges of the inferior courts shall be appointed by
the Cabinet from a list of persons nominated by the
Supreme Court. All such judges shall hold office for a
term of ten (10) years with privilege of reappointment,
provided that they shall be retired upon the attainment of
the age as fixed by law.
2) The judges of the inferior courts shall receive, at
regular stated intervals, adequate compensation which
shall not be decreased during their terms of office.186
This presents a body of constitutional provisions which:
1)
establishes a unified judiciary centered around a Supreme Court and such
lower courts as will be established by the legislature (Art. 76(1) and (2)); 2)
gives the Supreme Court rulemaking authority over judicial affairs while
enabling it to the delegate that authority to lower courts as it sees fit (Art.
77); and 3) provides the basic structures for selection and appointment of
judges with a number of safeguards in place so as to guarantee the status of
judges and limit the risk of interference in how they carry out their jobs
(Arts. 76(3), 78, 79, 80).
The Court Act 187 represents the legislature’s constitutionally
intended 188 engagement in the design of Japan’s judicial institutional
organization. This law lays out the structure of the judiciary in terms of the
hierarchy and subject matter jurisdictional boundaries of courts,189 gives
detail to the processes for appointment and removal of judges, and
establishes subordinate organs of the court, including the General Secretariat
and the Legal Training and Research Institute.
In short, governance of Japan’s independent judiciary is entrusted to a
hierarchy of broadly participatory Judicial Assemblies that replicates the
hierarchical structure of the courts, with the top level of command given
186

KENPŌ, ch. VI (articles relating to the Judiciary) (excerpted).
Saibanshohō [Court Act], Law No. 59 of 1947.
188
KENPŌ, art. 76 (“ . . . as established by law”).
189
Geographic boundaries of lower courts are established by a separate statute. Saibanshohō [Court
Act], Law No. 59 of 1947, art. 2, para. 2 (the details of establishment, abolition and jurisdictional district of
lower instance courts shall be provided for by law separately.).
187
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over to the Judicial Assembly of the Supreme Court, constituted by the
Supreme Court’s entire membership with the Chief Justice as its chair.190
Three other sections of this law are relevant to the discussion of
instrumental judicial administration in Japan. They are the establishment
of the General Secretariat in Article 13,191 the authorization to the Supreme
Court to carry out the nationwide posting of judges,192 and the guarantee
that judges will not be removed or transferred against their will.193
What is most significant here is that many of the ways that the
Supreme Court structures its administrative system to enable instrumental
judicial administration are neither constitutionally nor statutorily mandated.
The key structures in the system, notably the unified centralized
administrative structures and the heavily bureaucratic operational
mechanisms, were discretionarily created by the Supreme Court.
Moreover, the legislatively established Judicial Assemblies have devolved
into paper tigers exerting no real power. 194 Accordingly, while future
change could be accomplished through the heavy hand of legislation, it is
equally feasible to imagine the Court redesigning its systems and practices to
ameliorate current problems. Everything needed for the task is already in
place.
2.

History Lying in the Roots of the Present

Professor Sasada views the current circumstances in Japan as a
pendulum swing, where the courts went from their pre-war status
subordinated to the Ministry of Justice for administrative affairs, past a
suitable balance point, and rose up the arc to the opposite height of the
Supreme Court administrators’ barely sharing their power with any judges
outside of their inner-most circle.195
Today’s situation harkens back to the circumstances arising under the
Meiji Constitution pursuant to which the judiciary lacked the power to carry
190
Saibanshohō [Court Act], Law No. 59 of 1947, art. 12, para. 1 (Supreme Court Judicial
Assembly); Id. at art. 20, para. 1 (High Court Judicial Assemblies); Id. at art. 29, para. 2 (District Court
Judicial Assemblies).
191
Id. at art. 13 (“The Supreme Court shall have a General Secretariat, which shall handle
administrative affairs of the Supreme Court.”).
192
Id. at art. 47 (“Judges of lower courts shall be assigned to positions by the Supreme Court.”)
193
Id. at art. 48 (“A judge shall not be removed or be transferred, or be suspended from performing
his job, or have his salary reduced, against his will, except in accordance with the provisions of law
concerning public impeachment or national referendum, or unless the judge is declared mentally or
physically incompetent to perform his/her duties in accordance with provisions of applicable law.”)
194
Similarly, the possibility in Article 77(3) of distributing administrative powers to lower courts
appears lifeless.
195
Sasada interview, supra note 22.
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out its administrative affairs even as to the hiring and firing of judges.
Instead, administrative power was entrusted to the executive branch and
carried out by the Ministry of Justice.196 Although the judiciary jealously
guarded its autonomy with regards to decision-making in cases, these
circumstances left the judiciary vulnerable and dependent on the executive
branch.197
These conditions, the judiciary’s perceived vulnerability and
dependency, were profoundly significant in the drafting process of the
present Constitution. Allied Occupation authorities and many Japanese
participants actively sought new constitutional language to strengthen and
divorce the judiciary from the executive branch by giving the judiciary
explicit authority over administrative litigation cases and by entrusting it
with its own administrative affairs.198
On the Japanese side, language accomplishing the abolition of nonreviewable administrative courts emerged independently in the Matsumoto
draft, scooped by the Mainichi Shimbun on February 1, 1946, which
provided: “Every lawsuit against any administrative government office for
infringement on rights by illegal measures or any other lawsuits concerning
administrative affairs shall fall under the jurisdiction of a judicial court.”199
As well, the top-secret SCAP drafting group’s committee on the judiciary200
drew from an accurate understanding of the pre-war circumstances and
worked to create constitutional language that significantly empowered the
Supreme Court.201
196

Every provision in the Meiji Constitution’s chapter on the judiciary included the qualifying phrase
“according to law.” The judiciary’s claim to autonomy drew upon the provision of Article 57 which
designated that they exercised their power “in the name of the Emperor.” While this enabled the judiciary
to hold onto a substantial degree of independence as to its decision-making authority in cases, the courts
were nonetheless administratively dependent on the legislature, which in turn, handed that authority over to
the Ministry of Justice. MEIJI KENPŌ, ch. V; see generally ITOH, supra note 47, at 250; Haley supra note
18, at 114-15. And, while Ministry of Justice involvement is not inherently harmful, it was certainly
perceived as such in the constitutional drafting process. See supra note 120 and text infra at notes 198201.
For example, Germany’s current system incorporates Ministry involvement in judicial
administration, though not in hiring or firing judges. E-mail from Prof. Tom Ginsburg, University of
Chicago, August 11, 2010 (on file with author).
197
Id.; see also Sasada interview, supra note 22.
198
Empowering the courts was among the top priorities in the Allied Authorities’ immediate postsurrender planning for the restructuring of the Japanese government. See text supra note 120.
199
The Tentative Plan of the Constitutional Problem Investigation Committee art. 61, Feb. 1, 1946,
available in DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 120, at RM110.
200
Team members were Lt. Col. Milo E. Rowell, Comdr. Alfred R. Hussey, Jr., and Miss Margaret
Stone. Organization into Drafting Committees, available in DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 120, at
RM145.
201
A debate soon emerged between the members of the team and Charles L. Kades, chairman of the
Steering Committee for the project, who expressed concern that an over-powerful judicial oligarchy might
emerge. Most likely as a result, some provisions were then modified. Meeting of the Steering
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Although the chapter on the judiciary in today’s Constitution very
closely resembles the language that the Occupation authorities first proposed
to the Japanese,202 there was little substantive difference from Japanese
proposals. Thus, the constitutional terms for this branch of government do
not appear to have been significant in the negotiations, and Professor
Sasada’s assessment that Chapter VI represents a consensus understanding
shared by both sides in the drafting process “to swing the pendulum”
towards a stronger foundation for the courts in the nation’s governance
appears correct. With that momentum, the Supreme Court, under the
stewardship of an initial cadre of administrators transferred in from the
Ministry of Justice,203 quickly handed over to its General Secretariat the
complete power over judicial administration. Since then, the elites at the
center of the judiciary, drawing from powerful sentiments of historical and
presently perceived vulnerability to outside interference, 204 have not let
go.205
IV.

CONCLUSION: PRESCRIPTIONS AND REMEDIES

For all the vast body of academic writing on Japanese law that
identifies instrumental judicial administration in action and explores its
underlying dynamics, less attention goes to the means to change the system
so as to strengthen procedural civil justice in Japan. Yet, the previous
discussion of the legal regime shows that procedural civil justice is wellrooted in the text of the law while the structures that enable instrumental
judicial administration are less sound. Moreover, as Professor Ohbuchi and
his colleagues have demonstrated drawing upon national survey data of

Committee with Committee on the Judiciary, Feb. 7, 1946; Judiciary: Draft A, Feb. 6, 1946; Judiciary:
Draft B ("Rowell"), Feb. 6, 1946; Judiciary: final draft, Feb. 9, 1946, available in DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY, supra note 120, RM167, RM169-71.
202
U.S. Model Constitution as Submitted to the Japanese Cabinet, Feb. 13, 1946, available in
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 120, at RM 189.
203
ITOH, supra note 47, at 254 (“[T]he initial composition of the general Secretariat consisted largely
of bureaucrats of the pre-war Justice Ministry.”).
204
See text and sources cited supra note 21.
205
Drawing on his political science background, David Law valuably points out that this degree of
centralized control could just as easily become an engine to rapidly change the court’s prevailing value
system to liberal policies if the judicial elites come to believe that is the direction political winds are
blowing. Law, supra note 25, at 1587-1593. Professor Sasada shares this assessment. Sasada
interview, supra note 22. However, this would not so much represent a loosening of instrumental judicial
administration’s bindings, but its repurposing to different aims.
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former litigants, this is not simply the hope of idealistic academics; Japanese
people themselves care about fairness.206
Possible actors include litigation parties, the national legislature, or
the courts themselves.207 This Part very briefly reviews some of those
possibilities, laying out a skeletal map of territory that waits for more
detailed exploration.
A.

“We’re Not Gonna Take It”—Options for Litigation Parties

The first possibility is that an aggrieved party could raise this when
seeking appellate review of an adverse lower court ruling. This presents a
presumably bleak route. As evidenced by case law described above with
regards to judicial challenge under Article 24, Japanese courts have hardly
been sympathetic to claims that civil litigation procedures were unfair owing
to judicial behavior. Moreover, the futility is supported by other factors
including that the party would be seeking remediation from precisely the
same institution that carried out the alleged violation of her rights in the first
place, that acknowledgment of violation of procedural civil justice in the
case would also present grounds for granting the relief originally sought in
the case, which was precisely what the engagement of instrumental judicial
administration was intended to avoid, and lastly, depending on the variant of
instrumental judicial administration believed to have influenced the fairness
of the litigation, proof would be exceedingly hard to establish.208
However, Japanese law allows a means of collateral attack on civil
litigation results somewhat akin to a habeas corpus petition in the United
States’ criminal justice system. This is a suit for damages arising under the

206

See Ohbuchi et al., supra note 20, at 889 (“[T]he present results strongly suggest that fairness is an
authentic concern among litigants of civil trials even in collectivist cultures, such as Japan, and it influences
their responses to the civil trial in the same fashion as among individualist cultures.”).
207
As to increasing external pressures on the courts for increased accountability, it seems Japan is
hardly alone. See Nuno Garoupa and Tom Ginsberg, Judicial Audiences, supra note 23, at 462-63 (“We
believe that there have been secular pressures on all countries that are forcing judiciaries to place greater
weight on external audiences. No doubt the increasing importance of the media in democratic countries
forces all government agencies to consider the public relations aspects of their work. Beyond this general
trend, there has been an increasing ‘judicialization of politics’ in many countries. If judges are having a
greater impact on matters of political and social importance, it is only natural that there will be greater
interest in the operation of the judiciary and demands for greater judicial accountability. Unprecedented
political stability after WWII has also reduced the pressure for judicial formalism that shielded the judiciary
from periodical changes of political regime that characterized most of the nineteenth and early twentieth
century in Europe.”) (citation omitted).
208
At best, mechanisms of instrumental judicial administration described in Tiers 3 and 4 above
might present evidence of actions that proximately caused a distortion in the results of the case, but that
seems nearly impossible with regards to the mechanisms described in Tiers 1 and 2.
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National Compensation Act, 209 which derives from Article 17 of the
Constitution: “Every person may sue for redress as provided by law from
the State or a public entity, in case he has suffered damage through illegal
act of any public official.”210
I do not mean to blithely suggest that a lawsuit under the National
Compensation Act would be much more fruitful than a direct challenge on
appeal, but it is important to note that claims under this law put a few more
tools at the parties’ disposal. First, while the party will still seek
remediation from the institution that carried out the alleged violation of her
rights, a prevailing case in a National Compensation Law action would only
entitle the parties to some modicum of damages and should not necessarily
involve undoing the legal rulings in the original action.211
More importantly, an action under the National Compensation Act
would focus attention on the alleged instrumental judicial administration.
Such a case invites an opportunity for investigation into the underlying
circumstances in the original action. The aggrieved party could call the
judges involved in the case, or administrators involved in deciding judicial
transfers, to the witness stand to explore what really happened. Again,
pessimism should be the order of the day, but in an egregious case, a lawsuit
could set the stage for testimony where an honest judge or judicial
administrator as a sworn witness would enlighten us all.
Lastly, such an action takes into account the role of courts and
litigation as a cultural performance.212 If Japanese lawyers faced with
suspect circumstances began to routinely challenge such actions in collateral
claims under the National Compensation Law, media reports on these suits
would begin to inform and educate the public with regards to the
circumstances of instrumental judicial administration that now circulate
primarily in academic circles only.
B.

Change By Command—Possibilities for the Legislature

Legislative reform represents the next realm of possibility. Japan’s
parliament clearly has the constitutional authority to enact laws pertaining to
the courts, as it has done through the Court Act and the Code of Civil
209

Kokka Baishinhō [National Compensation Act], Law No. 125 of 1948; see also X v. Y, supra note

177.
210

KENPŌ, art. 17.
For example, after a decision denying the unconstitutionality of some government action, a
collateral ruling could give nominal damages to the plaintiffs, but the determination of constitutionality
would remain on the books.
212
See supra note 112.
211
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Procedure. At the same time, it is equally clear that the drafters of the
Constitution contemplated a definite no-fly zone for the legislature with
regards to judicial affairs. Thus, any potential legislative engagement
would be subject to constitutional limits and the arbiter of those limits would
be the Supreme Court acting as “the court of last resort” in constitutional
review.213
As noted above, Japan’s legislature has already stepped into judicial
reform affairs by the establishment of the Lower Court Judge Designation
Consultation Commission214 and the qualified success of the Commission
reflects what can be hoped for from the potential of legislative reform.
That is to say the Commission may have brought about modest changes in
reducing the possibility of instrumental judicial administration through
judicial appointments and reappointment, but it does not appear to have
made any dramatic changes in fact nor to have significantly changed the
“Trust Us” mindset of judicial administrators.215
Nonetheless, Professor Sasada proposes a greater role for outside
oversight panels with regards to judicial administration. In his account,
these could be especially important as to personnel reviews pertaining to
promotions, now carried out internally, and to mind after the Personnel
Affairs Bureau of the General Secretariat’s complete dominance over all
assignments and transfers.216
Another option would be decentralization of judicial administration,
as appears to have been intended by Article 77(3) of the Constitution. Thus
for example, Germany shares its civil law tradition with Japan, 217 but
authority over assignments and transfers lies at the state level, so that lower
court judges are not beholden to a single centralized body of
administrators. 218 While it is generally understood that constitutional
213
KENPŌ, art. 81 (“The Supreme Court is the court of last resort with the power to determine the
constitutionality of any law, order, regulation or official act.”).
214
See text and sources cited supra notes 37-40.
215
Japan has had a Freedom of Information Law with regards to government operations since the
early 1990s. Gyōsei Kikan no Hoyū Suru Johō ni Kan Suru Hōritsu [Act on Access to Information Held
by Administrative Organs], Law No. 42 of 1999. However, as with its counterpart in the United States,
the judiciary is excluded from its coverage. Id. at art. 2 (judiciary not listed among the government organs
covered by the law).
216
Sasada interview, supra note 22; see generally Nuno Garoupa &Tom Ginsberg, Guarding the
Guardians: Judicial Councils and Judicial Independence, 57 AM. J. COMP. L. 103 (2009).
217
Japan’s Code of Civil Procedure is primarily derived from the German counterpart. See, e.g.,
Japan: Introduction and Historical Background of Japanese Civil Procedure, in CIVIL LITIGATION IN
COMPARATIVE CONTEXT 35, 36 (Oscar G. Chase et al. eds., Foundation Press 2007).
218
David S. Clark, The Selection and Accountability of Judges in West Germany, 61 S. CAL. L. REV.
1795, 1816-27 (1988); PETER L. MURRAY & ROLF STÜRNER, GERMAN CIVIL JUSTICE 71 (Carolina
Academic Press 2004).
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constraints would bar the transfer of judicial authority from the nation to
freestanding court systems under the authority of autonomous local
entities, 219 this would not preclude moving the realpolitik of judicial
administration from the Supreme Court’s General Secretariat to secretariat
bodies in the lower courts.220
Ultimately, the stronger power enjoyed by the legislature is not in how
it might enact specific laws directing particulars regarding judicial
administration, but in the broader vulnerability that the judiciary already
perceives as to the risk of broader legislative interference in judicial affairs.
Professor Taniguchi notes the importance of the legislature’s existing
manner of approving budgets and judicial nominations almost unfailingly
following the wishes of the court. In his assessment, judicial elites are
deeply aware that nothing precludes the legislature from instead becoming
stingy with budgets and more inquisitorial or adversarial with regards to
judicial nominations. 221 Thus, the real potential for the legislature to
address instrumental judicial administration in the courts in Japan appears to
be not by direct action so much as by its ability to induce change drawing
upon a threat of actions that need not even be openly stated.
C.

Change From Within—Internal Reform by the Courts

In the end, the greatest possibility for change rests with the courts
themselves. Whether that change is motivated by litigants’ successfully
changing public opinion through effective “performances” in challenging the
system, by a sense of looming threat of unwanted intervention from the
legislature, or simply reflecting changing values as a new generation of
judges reaches the most influential levels, the fact remains that Japan’s
approach to judicial administration is primarily entrusted to the courts and
they are in the best position to effectuate reform.
As noted above, the tools for accomplishing change are already in the
Supreme Court Justices’ hands. 222 The present system puts formal
authority over judicial affairs in the judicial assemblies. Thus, the first step
for releasing the General Secretariat’s powerful grip would take nothing
219

KENPŌ, art. 76 (placing the “whole judicial power” in the national judiciary), ch. VIII (titled
“Local Self-Government”). Constitutional amendment of course opens up all sorts of possibilities, but is
not considered here in light of the inherent complexities with such a route. See id. at ch. IX.
220
As this approach is already enabled by Article 77(3) of the Constitution and the establishment of
lower courts’ Judicial Assemblies and secretariat operations in the Court Act, it shifts the locus of action to
internal reforms by the Courts as discussed infra Part IV.C.
221
Taniguchi interview, supra note 21.
222
And with no one more powerful to take up this opportunity that the Chief Justice. See Law,
supra note 25, at 1589-93.
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more than the Supreme Court Judicial Assembly taking the power that it is
entitled to under the law. Similarly, the Constitution already contemplates
decentralization of judicial rulemaking to the lower courts, and the Court
Act establishes judicial assemblies and secretariats for all of the lower courts.
Thus, it would only take an exercise of internal rulemaking by the Supreme
Court Judicial Assembly to transfer to the lower courts a greater engagement
with judicial administration, thereby decreasing the General Secretariat’s
capacity to interfere with procedural fairness in civil litigation through
instrumental behavior.223
Drawing upon direct personal contacts and conversations, Professors
Sasada already sees substantial change in the mindset of central judicial
administrators. In particular, since the year 2000 and the opening of the
Judicial Reform Counsel, the enormous endeavor undertaken by the
judiciary, government officials, lawyers, and scholars to critically assess
Japan’s criminal and civil justice system and to open up discussions for
accomplishing real change has had a tremendous impact. As well, political
dynamics, most significantly the first fall of the Liberal Democratic Party
(“LDP”) in 1993 and thereafter the understanding that genuine two-party
politics was possible in Japan brought judicial administrators to see their
world differently. To the extent that the administrators respond to
governmental political interests, a judiciary no longer obliged to appease a
conservative LDP monopoly on power can steer a more centrist course for
the law.224
For another close observer, Professor Taniguchi, generational change
has been a significant factor. He believes that part of the perception of
vulnerability among judicial elites in the early post-war years reflected a
distrust of the practicing bar. In pre-war Japan, judges and lawyers had
been trained on entirely separate tracks and there were little interpersonal
ties or social connections between the two communities. Moreover, in
those early years, with a significant portion of the practicing bar associated
223

The idea of the General Secretariat itself driving these changes is a hopeful possibility. Thus for
example, John Haley believes that “if the [judicial elites in control] perceive a problem, they’ll fix it.”
Interview with John Haley, Professor, Washington University School of Law, in Tokyo, Japan (June 3,
2010). Perhaps this will be true if those elites perceive sufficient external pressures, but for this author,
such an optimistic scenario seems somewhat incongruent with the present institution as Law describes it.
See Law, supra note 25. Judicial elites could also impede meaningful reform and they apparently have
done just that. Professor Itoh shares a report of former Justice Shunzo Kobayashi who “complained in
1959 that the general secretariat thwarted structural reform plans which had been supported by the majority
of justices.” ITOH, supra note 47, at 251.
224
Sasada interview, supra note 22. Specifically, the Odakyu decision enjoining government action
in the construction of a highway in central Tokyo and an increasing number of Supreme Court dissents both
reflect these changes in the case law.
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with the radical left, social justice litigation was often directly tied to leftist
causes. This in turn fostered a perception of the bar being at the opposite
political pole from Japan’s ruling party, to whom the judiciary was
institutionally beholden. Both of these dynamics have changed greatly in
recent decades. As all of today’s judges trained together with practicing
lawyers at the Legal Training and Research Institute, there is a
corresponding greater respect for the competence of lawyers and trust in the
reasonableness of their political views. This helps ease the court’s sense of
political vulnerability.225
Nevertheless, neither Professor Sasada or Professor Taniguchi view
the status quo as entirely satisfactory.226 Their assessments are appropriate.
Most of the operating mechanisms for instrumental judicial administration
remain firmly in place. While the actual practice of instrumental judicial
administration may have lessened, 227 genuine reform would be best
accomplished by the courts’ implementing structural changes to disable the
system. This would improve both the perception and reality of fairness in
the system and ensure a lasting step towards the achievement of civil justice
in Japan.
D.

Finale

In the end, the story told here is of the convergence of two threads—
both of which appear to result from “continuities of consciousness”228 that
derive from Japan’s indigenous legal development in the course of
modernization.
The first is the enduring legacy of pre-war legal
understandings, handed down through a conservative self-replicating core of
judicial elites that understands criminal procedural justice as a fundamental
constitutional right, but not so with civil procedural justice, which only
attains less significant status as a softer statutory protection. The second is
the nature of judicial administration in Japan that played forward pre-war
anxieties among judicial elites as to their vulnerability to outside intrusions.
Accordingly, they created, in part on constitutional design and in part
through sheer fiat, a powerful self-sustaining centralized judicial
225

Taniguchi interview, supra note 21; Professor Taniguchi explains these dynamics more
thoroughly in a recent book chapter. Yasuhei Taniguchi, The Changing Image of Japanese Practicing
Lawyers, in EMERGING CONCEPTS OF RIGHTS IN JAPANESE LAW 223, 228-30 (Harry N. Scheiber and
Laurent Mayali, eds., The Robbins Collection 2007).
226
Sasada interview, supra note 22; Taniguchi interview, supra note 21.
227
However, as the troubling circumstances in the tobacco product litigation described above are very
recent, they suggest that even direct instrumental judicial administration may still be occurring.
228
Mark Levin, Continuities of Consciousness: Professor John Haley’s Writings on Twelve Hundred
Years of Japanese Legal History¸ 8 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 317 (2009).
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administration system. In turn, this system enables instrumental judicial
administration to be played out powerfully in accordance with the designs of
the elites who may place their thumbs on the balance of how civil and
administrative cases are decided in Japan.229 Many beneficial values are
served by the present system, including highly capable judicial decisionmaking, predictability, and the preservation of an autonomous judiciary from
direct political interference. But sometimes, in some cases, most likely
cases with great social significance, the process has not been fair. That’s
all.
This can surely change—the recipes are in any number of writings by
Japanese legal scholars; other ideas are suggested above—and perhaps
things have changed somewhat already. In any case, as the reggae great
Jimmy Cliff stated so plainly, “You can get it if you really want. But you
must try, try and try. Try and try, you'll succeed at last.”

229

Whether the elites are choosing their own course or traveling at the direction of some other master
does not matter in this discussion. The salient point is that central administrators interrupt gravity’s
neutral pull on the scales of Justice’s balance that should be entrusted to independent judges’ conscientious
deliberations.

